Essays in debt sustainability and financial stability by Henao Arbelaez, Camila
© 2018 Camila Henao Arbela´ez
ESSAYS IN DEBT SUSTAINABILITY AND FINANCIAL STABILITY
BY
CAMILA HENAO ARBELA´EZ
DISSERTATION
Submied in partial fulllment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
in the Graduate College of the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2018
Urbana, Illinois
Doctoral Commiee:
Assistant Professor Minchul Shin, Chair
Professor Dan Bernhardt
Professor Charles M. Kahn
Professor Stefan Krasa
Abstract
In chapter one, I construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of optimal default,
in which the government optimally holds net debt and aachable assets. e model is novel
as it allows for the possibility of debt to be enforced. is is a vast improvement upon previ-
ous models, which nd that the optimal level of assets the sovereign chooses in the long run is
zero. Here, asset savings have other roles dierent than consumption smoothing. ey impact
repayment incentives and borrowing costs. Whenever debt is enforceable through a fraction of
assets that can be conscated should the government default, equilibrium aachable asset hold-
ings can be dierent than zero. I nd that aachable asset holdings and aachability, increase
debt sustainability, and further provide access to funds. e main mechanism by which this oc-
curs is the endogenous interest rate. It is found to be decreasing in the aachability parameter,
and increasing in the probability of redemption. I calibrate α to match observed aachable as-
set levels. Results indicate a ninefold increase in aachability from the late 1990s to 2010 (from
10% to 93%); these results then allow me to match the observed rising trend in aachable asset
holdings since the late 1990s. In synthesis, this paper argues that larger aachability—which can
be interpreted as relentless litigation, severe threats of conscation, and less favorable rulings
toward sovereigns—explains the rise in the observed percentage of debt aached and aachable
asset holdings.
In chapter two, we ask if government nancial assets help improve public debt sustainability.
We assemble a comprehensive dataset on government assets using multiple sources and covering
110 advanced and emerging market economies since the 1980s. We then use this rich database
to estimate the impact of assets on two key dimensions of debt sustainability: borrowing costs
and the probability of debt distress. Government assets signicantly reduce sovereign spreads
and the probability of debt crises in emerging economies, but not in advanced economies; this
ii
eect varies with asset characteristics, notably liquidity. Assets also help discriminate among
countries across the distribution of sovereign spreads, thus signaling information about emerging
economies’ creditworthiness.
Chapter three systematically documents the impact on output dynamics of an additional unit of
debt-to-tax revenue, conditional on the occurrence of nancial shocks. I examine whether bank-
ing crises are systematically dierent from other nancial catastrophes (currency crises), and,
most importantly, whether pre-crises scal buers are particularly important whenever bank-
ing crises materialize. Lastly, the paper investigates post-crisis output dynamics considering
pre-crisis debt-to-tax revenue, and examine whether the post-crisis dynamics are systematically
dierent for emerging and developing economics than for advanced economies. Using panel
data for 155 countries for the period of 1975-2011, I estimate a univariate autoregressive model in
growth rates, and construct impulse response functions to display the relationship between debt-
to-tax-revenue conditional on a nancial crisis and output dynamics. Using three approaches to
account for the endogeneity of crises and scal burden, I nd that an additional unit of debt-
to-tax revenue prior to a banking crisis is associated with larger output losses than when the
same situation occurs prior to a currency crisis. Emerging and developing economies experience
deeper losses than advanced countries; this is due not only to banking and currency crises, but
because of marginal increases in the pre-crisis debt-to-tax-revenue ratios.
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Chapter 1
Sovereign Optimal Default with Aachable Assets
1.1 Introduction
Policymakers, academics, and market participants have recently begun to express interest in the
possibility of enforceable sovereign debt contracts. e issuance of Venezuelan bonds oers a
recent, albeit extreme, example of enforceable debt. Despite facing severe economic and political
turmoil, with vast food and medicine shortages, Venezuela continued to make timely repayments
toward its bond obligations until November 20171. Fears that creditors may seize oil assets or
receivables, and that they may initiate protracted lawsuits, have been cited by the press as likely
reasons why the nation continues to service foreign bondholders. Particular fears revolve around
Citgo, PDVSA’s Houston-based rening sister company. Not only is it under U.S. jurisdiction, but
it has also been used as explicit collateral in certain 2017 bond issuances. International holdouts
would not hesitate to sue, given an eventual default, and aempt to obtain favorable payments,
using Citgo and other oil receivables as leverage.
Bankruptcy law is signicantly dierent for rms and governments. When a rm defaults on
its bonds, bondholders are the rst to receive a stake in the rm’s assets. Governments, on the
other hand, cannot be liquidated, and their assets have traditionally been protected by interna-
tional immunity clauses. ese clauses make any aempt at asset conscation very dicult.
e interpretation and applicability of the international immunity clauses have changed over
time, and international law has become more lenient to creditors in the last three decades (see
for example Panizza et al. (2009) and Schumacher et al. (2018)). Panizza et al. (2009) argue that
the protection sovereigns used to receive under immunity clauses has eroded over time, “both
1On November 2017, Venezuela delayed payments on bonds for its state-owned oil company, PDVSA; as of
January, 2018, however, all arrears had been cleared. is event has been termed as a “selective” or “quasi” default.
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through statutory changes, and through case law, opening a window for legal enforcement.”
A natural question is whether sovereign credit market conditions are dierent as a result of
the increased possibility of legal enforcement of sovereign debt contracts. Evidence based on a
systematic dataset of all lawsuits led, in the United States or the United Kingdom, against de-
faulting countries between 1976 and 2010, indicates that credit market conditions have changed
in favor of the creditor (Schumacher et al., 2018). Since the mid-1990’s, court rulings have become
much more frequent and severe, and much more likely to involve aempts to aach sovereign
assets abroad. e authors nd that countries undergoing litigation processes with threats of
aachability have diculty accessing international funds, and that legal threats increased credi-
tors’ bargaining power. According to the authors, creditors have used courts “to pressure foreign
governments to improve the terms of the debt restructuring, repay their claims in full, or even
abstain from defaulting in the rst place.” is paper formally analyzes the concept of aacha-
bility2 and its impact on credit markets. e sovereign will be able to issue debt and save in the
form of partially aachable assets. I investigate how the possibility of enforceable debt shapes
incentives to repay or to default, and how aachable assets impact debt sustainability, and access
to, and the cost of funds.
Aachable assets (AA henceforth) are dened as the most liquid nancial assets in the gov-
ernment’s balance sheet — that is, the total of monetary gold and special drawing rights (SDRs),
currency and deposits, and debt securities. Due to their liquid nature, aachable assets are rela-
tively seizable. Furthermore, the bulk of these assets are held in sovereign wealth funds. Most of
these are held abroad, and are thus aachable. ough this measure of aachable assets might
generate some criticism, largely because foreign versus domestic assets cannot be untangled, this
measure nonetheless oers the best available approximation of liquid and aachable assets. e
measurement of aachable assets is constructed from a unique dataset of government nancial
assets as in Henao-Arbela´ez and Sobrinho (2017).
Figure 1.1 shows the heterogeneity in AA holdings across countries. In fact, two similar coun-
tries, with the same level of debt, might have drastically dierent AA holdings. is is the case, for
example, for pairs such as ailand and Indonesia, and for Finland and Sweden. What could ex-
2Aachability will be dened as the ability to seize assets or payments, should a government default, to com-
pensate the creditor.
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plain dierences in country’s portfolios? Can these dierent portfolio holdings emanate from an
optimality principle? In this paper, I delve into the optimal portfolio allocation of the sovereign,
and examine how the optimal allocations change as aachability becomes more eective.
Figure 1.1: Aachable Asset and Net Debt Holdings (% GDP)
(a) AA Vs. Net Debt: EMs, 2013
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Aachable asset holdings have not remained stable in time, either. For most of the 1980s and
1990s the median AA holding was stable at about 5.5% of GDP. However, starting in 1997, AA
holdings have risen to about 10% in 2010 (see Figure 1.2). ere are, undoubtedly, many factors
behind the twofold increase in aachable assets since the late 1990s. An obvious factor is the
sharp increase in oil prices in the same time period. However, there might also be an aachability
story which can partially explain the change in aachable asset holdings.
Eective aachability cases are not outliers. In recent years there have been plenty of examples
in which assets have been conscated or tied up in U.S. or U.K. courts. e rise in litigation and
aachability threats is now part of a general trend. Starting in the late 1990s and as of 2010, 50%
of all sovereign debt crisis involved litigation, compared to less than 10% in the early 1980s and
1990s. Furthermore, the number of litigation cases with aachment aempts have increased by
six fold between the mid-1990s and 2010. ose cases have grown from fewer than ve in 1995,
to 30 in 2010 (see gure 6 in Schumacher et al. (2018)).
Generally, sovereign litigations work in the following manner: Aer a default, either a special-
ized distress debt fund or a hedge fund buys discounted bonds in the secondary market. Shortly
aer, they sue in a jurisdiction likely to enforce. e litigation and potential threat of aachability
3
Figure 1.2: Median Aachable Asset as % GDP
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usually force the government to sele at favorable conditions to the holdout; in extreme cases,
assets are conscated or international payments are diverted.
Schumacher et al. (2018) provide case studies of the most successful litigation cases. e largest
litigation success was the Argentina’s (2002-2016) case. Aer a long litigation and serious threats
of asset seizures, more than $10billion was transferred to holdouts. e estimated returns are
approximated to be between 300 per cent and 1, 270 per cent. Other cases estimate the returns to
holdouts at 400% (Republic of Congo 1984-2002), or between 60 and 300% for the 1995-96 case of
Panama´ Vs. Elliot.
It is common, furthermore, for court orders to block or conscate international payments, com-
modity royalties, or trade revenue. Aer the Republic of Congo default in the early 2000s, various
U.S.-based debt funds sued the Congo for debt repayment, and aempted a series of conscation
aempts on its oil exports. In 2006, a Houston court ordered that 500,000 Congolese barrels of
oil be conscated, and that the proceeds be used to satisfy the plainti creditors. Shortly aer-
wards, the Congolese government seled. Similar instances occurred in Zambia (1995-97), where
litigating creditors aached copper export revenues; and in Ecuador (1993), where creditors suc-
cessfully aached the country’s oil revenues (Schumacher et al., 2018).
e purpose of this paper is to build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of optimal
default, in which the government holds an optimal portfolio of net debt and nancial assets
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while facing an aachability constraint. Furthermore, the paper studies how aachability and AA
holdings impact debt sustainability, and access to and cost of funds, and consumption smoothing.
Finally, I analyze the various mechanisms through which AA holdings impact debt sustainability.
I contribute to the literature in three dierent ways: First, I construct a micro-founded model
to explain the sovereign’s optimal decision to borrow, repay, and hold a portfolio composed of
aachable assets and net debt. I model asset holding as partly collateralizable, an innovation that
allows me to explore the consequences of enforceable debt on sovereign debt markets. Second,
I calibrate the model using a unique dataset from government’s balance sheets for 13 emerging
market countries and 24 advanced economies (as in Henao-Arbela´ez and Sobrinho (2017)). To
my knowledge, this rich dataset on government nancial assets has not been used to calibrate a
model with these characteristics, particularly one in which creditors can potentially aach asset
savings. ird, I contribute to the literature by explaining, in part, the reasons for the recent rise
in median AA holdings.
1.2 Literature Review
is paper is related to a long strand of literature on optimal sovereign default in small open
economies, pioneered by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). In that paper, the authors develop a theo-
retical dynamic model with a default penalty, non-contingent debt, and a lack of full commitment;
the resulting model is able to generate equilibrium default. In later work, Aguiar and Gopinath
(2006) and Arellano (2008) exhibit the quantitative relevance of models a`-la Eaton-Gersovitz.
ey introduce non-commied net debt in strategic default models, and can replicate stylized
facts for the business cycle in emerging-market economies. Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) empha-
size the distinction between permanent and temporary income shocks. e authors can aribute
key stylized facts — such as the positive relationship between sovereign spreads and the trade
balance, or empirically relevant levels of default — to permanent income shocks.
Arellano (2008) studies the interactions between the level and volatility of output, sovereign
default, and interest rate spreads. She introduces an asymmetric default penalty, in which the
income process is less responsive to a positive shock in nancial autarky. e author calibrates
her model to Argentina, and can match equilibrium default rates and other stylized facts.
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e models of this rst wave, however, have a major shortcoming. Contemporaneous issuances
of debt and asset holdings are not allowed. Nonetheless, it is a well-documented phenomenon
that countries hold both debt and foreign assets3.
A large body of work explains this supposed paradox by stressing the self-insurance role of
reserves or assets. In these models, countries are able to use assets (or reserves) as a consumption-
smoothing mechanism, whenever a sudden interruption to international capital markets occurs.
Durdu et al. (2009) and Jeanne and Rancie`re (2011) are salient examples of dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium models that explain precautionary demand for reserves (or liquid interna-
tional assets) with an exogenous probability of sudden stop. Durdu et al. (2009) set up a model
with incomplete markets, and argue that the surge in precautionary demand for foreign assets
can be explained by nancial globalization and sudden stop risk. Jeanne and Rancie`re (2011), on
the other hand, allow for consumers to smooth consumption during sudden stops via insurance
contracts with foreign investors, or, equivalently, by nancing a stock of liquid reserves with
contingent debt. Note, however, that these are not optimal default models. Default or sudden
stop probabilities are exogenously given.
Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009), are the rst to incorporate debt and international reserves in a
setup of sovereign optimal default. Calibrating to a sample of emerging-market countries, they
nd, however, not only that reserves reduce debt sustainability, but also that countries hold zero
levels of reserves in a long-run equilibrium. Two reasons explain their results. First, they assume
a proportional output loss as default penalty. In fact, Salomao (2013) incorporates asymmetric
output costs (as in Arellano (2008)) associated with default, and replicates Alfaro and Kanczuk
(2009), but is able to obtain positive levels of reserves and debt in equilibrium. Second, in the
model the only source of risk are endowment uctuations. However, having more reserves pro-
vides the country with a larger buer to smooth consumption while in default, reduces debt
sustainability, and increases spreads. At the same time, this increases the cost of funds.
In this paper, assets will not necessarily reduce debt sustainability because debt can be par-
tially enforced. On the one hand, a larger asset stock will make default more aractive, because
the sovereign can use its saving buers to smooth consumption whenever hit with an adverse
3Assets can be in the form of reserves held by the central bank, or nancial assets belonging to the balance sheet
of the government.
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shock. On the other hand, however, asset savings are partially aachable; thus asset savings
can potentially increase the likelihood of direct punishment for default, and help to deter default
decisions.
Other papers have tried to harmonize the idea of debt and assets, in a context where asset hold-
ing is conducive to debt sustainability. is branch of the literature incorporates rollover risk and
long-term debt. In contemporaneous work, Hernandez (2017) extends the Eaton-Gersovitz frame-
work by introducing long-term debt and self-fullling crises. He nds that not only do reserves
have a role in equilibrium, but also that, given the net asset position of the sovereign, additional
reserves increase debt sustainability and lower borrowing costs. In similar work, Bianchi et al.
(2012) argue that only if debt maturity exceeds one period, does an indebted government accrue
reserves in equilibrium. In their model, issuing debt to buy reserves reduces the next period’s
borrowing costs, and allows for roll-over risk hedging.
is paper is also related to the deterrence eect of direct sanctions in sovereign default models,
particularly those related to credible threats of punishment. Bulow and Rogo (1989b), show
that countries that cannot establish credible reputations, can only borrow in international credit
markets if creditors have either political or legal rights to credibly threaten the lender’s interests
by either impeding a country’s trade, or by having the ability to seize its nancial assets abroad.
is paper delves into this idea, by exploring how various degrees of aachability aect optimal
decisions to borrow, repay, issue debt, and accrue aachable assets.
A specialized strand of work has focused on whether creditors have indeed been able to seize
sovereign assets in debt-repudiation events. Mitchener and Weidenmier (2010) cite the “scal
house arrest” episodes during the gold standard era (1870-1914) of Egypt, Greece, Morocco, Santo
Domingo, Tunis, and the Ooman Empire. Following debt-repudiation events, foreign creditor
nations imposed a scal administrator with the power to use tax revenue to pay international
obligations, and to intervene in debt selements favoring bondholders.
More recent examples of aachability are cited in Panizza et al. (2009). ey argue that since the
1980s international law has become more lenient to creditors, not necessarily ruling favorably
to sovereigns based on sovereign immunity principles (see Allied Bank International v. Banco
Cre´dito Agricola de Cartago as cited therein). During the 1990s several holdouts could receive
close to full repayment based on successful threats of obstructing nancial transactions of the
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debtor abroad, backed by court judgments that openly allowed commercial asset seizures. is
paper takes these instances of credible threats of aachability as precedence, and formally models
the debt and asset markets whenever government issues debt that can be partially commied.
1.3 Mechanism
e model presented here is a sovereign optimal default model, in which the government is a
benevolent dictator who derives utility from smoothing consumption of the representative house-
hold. Two policy tools are available for consumption smoothing, issuing debt, and saving in at-
tachable assets. e novelty of the model is that assets are used as a commitment device, resulting
in non-zero asset holdings in equilibrium. (Similar models without debt commitment are not able
to obtain positive assets holdings in equilibrium. See for example Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009)).
Here, as opposed to the mechanisms of traditional models, aachable assets inuence repay-
ment mechanisms in several ways. In traditional models with one-period debt and no possibility
of asset conscation, more assets provide the sovereign with further incentives to default. Assets
(or international reserves) compensate the direct output costs from nancial autarky, and provide
a buer for consumption smoothing in default.
In this model, however, the mechanism is not univocal. ere are three dierent ways in which
the stock of aachable assets and the aachability parameter4 impact debt sustainability. e
rst route occurs through borrowing costs. Larger holdings of aachable assets provide a larger
collateral for the government; this endogenously translates into lower borrowing costs. Ceteris
paribus, lower interest rate spreads make debt more sustainable. e second route takes place
through the direct punishment of having physical assets conscated. e more a government
may lose by not repaying its debt obligations (be it through having a large asset stock, or by
having a large fraction of it taken away), the likelier repayment will be. Direct punishment, thus,
also increases debt sustainability. e third route takes place through the savings consumption
buer. Whenever the fraction of assets being seized is small,5 any form of savings reduces the cost
of being excluded from international capital markets by providing an alternative to consumption
4e aachability parameter is dened as the fraction of assets that can be conscated.
5In Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009) the aachability parameter is zero because debt cannot be commied.
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smoothing, thus reducing debt sustainability.
All in all, aachable asset holdings and aachability will not necessarily make default more
aractive. In later sections, I show how these model mechanisms work by exploring how various
parameter values impact equilibrium AA holdings, debt, and default frequency.
1.4 Model Environment
To model optimal default and portfolio decisions, I follow the frameworks of Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981) and Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009). Both debt and assets are limited to one-period bonds. What
is novel here is that if the sovereign refuses its debt obligations, declaring default, it will face two
consequences. e economy will be in nancial autarky for a period of time, and a fraction of its
savings in the form of aachable assets (AA) will be seized by the international creditor.
e setup is that of a small, open economy, which receives a stochastic productivity shock. e
government is a benevolent dictator whose objective is to maximize the consumption stream of
the representative household. e utility function of the government is given by:
U = E[
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct )] with 0 < β < 1. (1.1)
Households are identical and risk averse, and characterized by an increasing and strictly con-
cave utility function. Constant relative risk aversion functional form for the utility of the house-
hold is assumed (Equation 1.2)
u (ct ) =
c
1−γ
t − 1
1 − γ (1.2)
Because preferences are concave in the tradable good, the government will want to smooth
household consumption of the household. e novelty of this model is not only that two policy
tools are available for consumption smoothing, but that asset holdings are used to commit debt,
providing a role for assets in the consumption-smoothing process.
Each period, the sovereign has the option to save in the form of aachable asset for next period
(At+1), to issue debt net of non-aachable assets, bt+1, and to decide whether to repay or default
on debt service payments, {R,D}. If default is chosen, the debtor is temporarily barred from
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international credit markets, and a penalty of αAt is imposed for every period in default. e
parameter α is the aachability parameter. It will be interpreted as the harshness of the direct
punishment for defaulting. If the government refused to service its debt the previous period, the
sovereign will be redeemed with probability θ . In that case, the government will start next period
with a good credit standing, zero debt, and the stock of AA it has le. If, on the other hand, the
government repays in period t , it can issue new debt for next period.
e timing of events is as follows. At the beginning of the period, the stock of aachable assets
(At ), net debt (bt ), and price schedules for assets and debt, qat and qbt , are given. e sovereign
chooses the amount of AA savings for the next period. At the end of the period, the random
income shock yt is realized (see Assumption 1). Debt service payments and default decisions are
taken. If the government paid o its debt from the current period, it is allowed to issue new debt.
en, taking qb as given, creditors choose bt+1. Consumption decisions take place at the end of
the period.
Assumption 1 (Output is stochastic) Income, yt = ezt takes a nite number of values, and
evolves over time according to a Markov transition matrix P (zi , zj ). In a simple benchmark economy,
zt will take three technological states (low, average, high). e extreme values will be 2.5 standard
deviations away from the mean.
ere are two budget constraints, depending on repayment decisions of the sovereign. If the
government repays its obligations at time t , it derives income from endowment,yt , debt issuance,
bt+1, and from AA savings from the previous period, At . e sovereign’s budget constraint under
repayment is given by Equation 1.3.
BCR : ct + bt + qatAt+1 = yt + qbt (bt+1,At+1, zt )bt+1 +At (1.3)
When the government defaults, there is an additional loss of output due to nancial autarky,
δ , and a fraction α of current savings are seized by the creditor. Note that, from the budget
constraint under default in Equation 1.4, the government is not able to issue new debt.
BCD : ct + qatAt+1 = (1 − δ )yt + (1 − α )At (1.4)
with At+1 ≥ 0
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Purchases of AA are only positive, whereas net debt purchases can be positive or negative. A
purchase of a discounted bond (be it debt or AA) with positive value means that the sovereign
has agreed to save qa (.)At+1 (or qb (.)bt+1) units of consumption today, in exchange for At+1 ≥ 0
(bt+1 ≥ 0) units of consumption tomorrow. A purchase of a discounted bond with negative
value for bt+1, on the other hand, means that the sovereign enters a contract in which it agrees to
receive−qb (.)bt+1 units of period t consumption goods today, and promises to deliver, conditional
on repayment, bt+1 units of consumption tomorrow.
International lenders are competitive and risk neutral, and are willing to borrow or lend at an
expected return of r ∗, the prevailing world risk-free rate. Foreign creditors choose the amount of
bonds to maximize expected prots, taking prices as given:
ϕt = q
b
t bt+1 −
(1 − λt )
1 + r ∗ bt+1 −
λtαAt
1 + r ∗bt+1 (1.5)
e probability of default, λt , is known to the lender at time t , is endogenously determined,
and a function of the sovereign’s portfolio and incentives to repay debt. From Equation 1.5 one
can derive the price schedule for bonds.
qbt (bt+1,At+1, zt ) =
1 − λt
(1 + r ∗) +
λtαAt
(1 + r ∗) (1.6)
Equation (1.6) is the no-arbitrage condition for the international debt market. If repayment
occurs, the price of the discount bond is equal to the opportunity cost of the outside investment
in the risk-free asset. Under default, the price of the bond is set to the present value of the
collateralized asset. Aachable assets, regardless of state, always yield the risk-free rate, and
their price is given by equation (1.7).
qat =
1
(1 + r ∗) (1.7)
Denote the value function of the economy with debt, assets, technological shock, and access
to the international credit market as V(bt ,At , zt ). Dene V R as the value of the objective func-
tion whenever the government decides to repay its debt; while V D represents the value if the
government decides to default. us, V(bt ,At , zt ) =max {V R (bt ,At , zt ),V D (At , zt )}.
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e following two denitions formally dene the value function under repayment and default,
respectively, as:
Denition 1 (Value of the objective function under repayment, R)
V R (bt ,At , zt ) =max
ct
{u (ct ) + βEtV(bt+1,At+1, zt+1)} (1.8)
subject to:
ct + bt + q
a
tAt+1 = yt + q
b
t (bt+1,At+1, zt )bt+1 +At
Denition 2 (Value of the objective function under default, D)
V D (At , zt ) =max
ct
{u (ct )
+ β[θEtV(0,At+1, zt+t ) + (1 − θ )EtV D (At+1, zt+1)]}
(1.9)
subject to:
ct + q
a
tAt+1 = (1 − δ )yt + (1 − α )At
and At+1 ≥ 0.
e probability of default, λt is dened as λt (bt+1,At+1, zt ) = Pr[V D (At , zt ) > V R (bt ,At , zt )],
and is known by the international lender at time t .
e solution strategy follows that of Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009). A default set is dened as the
set of states for which default is optimal. With the default set, one can obtain the price schedules,
qb and qa , and consecutively, solve the sovereign’s problem, as given by equations, (1.9), (1.8).
1.5 Computation: Equilibrium Solution
In this section, I describe the computational strategy used to solve for the equilibrium, and to
obtain the invariant distribution.
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1.5.1 Value Function Iteration
Dening a default set is relevant in computing the equilibrium. Given the state variables, it allows
one to pin down asset prices. With these prices, it is then possible to solve for the sovereign’s
recursive problem. Value function iteration is used to compute the equilibrium. e solution
algorithm is as follows:
1. Start with a guess for bonds and price schedule corresponding to the risk-free rate at each
point in the state-space qb (0) (b′,A′, z) = 11+r ∗ . Set q
a = 11+r ∗ .
2. Use the initial qb (0) and initial guess for V R (0) and V D (0) to iterate the Bellman equations
(1.8) and (1.9), and solve for optimal policies for aachable assets A′(b,A, z), debt holdings
b′(b,A, z), and probability of default λ(b′,A′, z).
3. Update the price function as qb (1) = Ez (1−λt+1)(1+r ∗) +
Ez (λt+1)αAt
(1+r ∗) .
4. Using qb (1) repeat steps (2) and (3) until |qb (i+1) − qb (i ) | < ϵ , where (i ) is the number of
iterations.
1.5.2 Invariant Distribution
e probability distribution of Zt evolves according to equation (1.10), where P is the transition
matrix.
pi ′t+1 = pi
′
tP . (1.10)
e invariant distribution is the probability vector pi , such that pi ′ = pi ′P . To compute the
invariant distribution, I iterate over (1.10). e invariant distribution allows me to compute the
long-term expected value of aachable asset holdings or debt issuances — under repayment or
default — and the expected default rate.
For each repayment option, r ∈ {R,D}, the invariant distribution is constructed in the following
manner:
1. Start with an arbitrary pi r0 =
1
2BAZ for r ∈ {R,D}; where B is the number of debt states, A of
AA states and Z is three, as there are three technological shocks.
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2. Recall that the policy functions for aachable assets and debt store the optimal grid index
associated with making optimal choices whenever the state is st = (bt ,At , zt ).
3. Construct a matrix object Cr that stores the optimal policy coordinates for each state. e
entry cr
(b ′a′,baz) = 1 if, for the (baz)
th state, the optimal policy response is bt+1 = b′ and
At+1 = a
′; ∀baz ∈ [0,BAZ ] and r ∈ {R,D}. ey entries of Cr are set to zero for any other
coordinate.
4. Create a broad-casted probability matrix as P˜ = P ⊗ ~1(BA,BAZ ) of dimension (BAZ ,BAZ ).
5. For each state, assign the probability of transitioning to z′ at t + 1, given optimal choices
at: C˜ = [P˜ ∗ (~1(Z ,1) ⊗ Cr )]T ; where “*” is element-wise multiplication.
6. Dene
piR1 = [(1 − λt )piR0 + θpiD0 ] × C˜ (1.11)
piD1 = [λtpiR0 + (1 − θ )piD0 ] × C˜ (1.12)
7. Iterate on equations 1.11 and 1.12, until max{|piR1 − piR0 |, |piD1 − piD0 |} < ϵ .
8. e expressions piR and piD provide the long-term, stable probability of being in a particular
state (bt ,At , zt ).
e long-term expected value of the optimal aachable asset holdings and debt issuances,
under repayment and default, is computed. For a given repayment status, the dot product of
the optimal aachable asset holdings (debt issuances) and the invariant distribution yields the
unconditional expected savings (or debt). e aachable assets expression for repayment status
r is (an analogous expression is constructed for debt):
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E(A˜r t+1) =
∫
z
A˜t+1(bt ,At , zt ) f (zt )dzt
or in the discrete case
E(A˜r t+1) = A˜t+1 · pi r
∀r ∈ {R,D}.
e expected default rate is the sum over the invariant distribution whenever the government
decided to default on its current debt at t . It sums up the probabilities over all states in which
default was optimal.
D =
∑
j∈[0,BAZ ]
piD . (1.13)
1.6 Calibration
e model is calibrated so that each period corresponds to one year. e stochastic process
for output is estimated from a log-normal AR(1) process, as in equation (1.14), for the panel
of countries. e estimated parameters are ρ = .902 and σϵ = 0.044, as listed in Table 1.1.
ln(yi,t+1) = α + ρln(yi,t ) + ϵit ; where ϵit ∼ N (0, σ 2ϵi ) (1.14)
Following the literature, I assume that the technology state can be discretized into three values:
Z low ,Zaveraдe andZhiдh . e normal density is integrated over each interval to obtain the values of
the Markov transition matrix. I employ a standard adrature Method, as in Tauchen (1986), with
extreme values being 2.5 standard deviations from the mean. Net debt and assets are discretized
into 25 points each. Debt can take values from −60% to 20% of GDP; while aachable assets range
from zero to 40% of GDP.
Output costs are set at δ = 10%, though I experimented with other values of δ , too (results
available upon request). Due to the lack of access to international goods and capital markets, it
15
Table 1.1: Parameter Values
Arellano(08) Alfaro-Kanczuk(09) Aguiar-Gopinath(06) Calibrated Value
Tech. autocorr. → ρz 0.945 0.85 model specic 0.902
Tech. std. dev. →σz 0.025 0.044 model specic 0.044
Output costs→δ 3% 10% 2% 10%
Risk aversion→γ 2 2 2 2
Risk free rate→r ∗ 1.7% (QoQ) 4% 1%(QoQ) 4%
Discount factor→β .953 0.5 0.8 0.93
Prob. of redemption→θ 28.2% 50% 10% 65%
Calibration
Fraction aached→α - - - 10% 93%
is reasonable to assume a lower autarky income. I set this value on par with Alfaro and Kanczuk
(2009). e risk-aversion coecient is set at two, consistent with business cycle and sovereign
default literature. e risk-free rate, corresponding to the average ve-year Treasury bond yield
is set at 4%, and in line with Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009).
Relatively high impatience is necessary to obtain reasonable default rates. e discount factor
is set at β = 0.93. is discount factor, however, is much higher than is traditional in the literature.
Similar models set it at 0.8, 0.5, or 0.88 (see for example, Aguiar and Gopinath (2006); Alfaro
and Kanczuk (2009); and Mendoza and Yue (2012), respectively). e probability of redemption
θ = 0.65 is set to agree to with an average stay in autarky of 0.3 years as estimated by Gelos et al.
(2004). Table 1.1 presents a synthesis of commonly used parameters, and those used in this paper
(shown in the last column).
1.7 Results
In this section, I will rst explain the policy functions and the intuition behind the agent’s optimal
decisions. Results will be evaluated at three extreme cases. In the rst case, a low technological
shock occurs, and no initial level of aachable assets is available; In the second case, the same
low productivity shock occurs, but the initial AA is allowed to take place at its maximum level;
and for last, a high technological shock occurs, and the initial AA level is set to zero.
Second, the model mechanisms will be made clear by investigating how varying the aach-
ability parameter and the probability of redemption impact the long-run equilibrium outcomes.
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For last, the calibrated results are presented and discussed.
1.7.1 Policy Functions
Default is used as a consumption-smoothing mechanism. Conditional on having no aachable
assets today, whenever the government is faced with an adverse technological shock, default
occurs at lower levels of debt (compare the green and blue lines in Figure 1.3a). However, hold-
ing aachable assets reverses this eect. Even when faced with an adverse shock, starting out
with the maximum amount of aachable assets increases debt sustainability (see red line in Fig-
ure 1.3a). Two factors explain the augmented willingness to pay. First, there is a direct loss in
utility from conscated assets, and this eect is larger the more assets the government holds.
Second, the sovereign has less ability to smooth consumption should it decide to negate its debt
obligations; thus, it has more incentive to repay.
Figure 1.3b shows the optimal debt level in the next period conditional on not having defaulted
this period. Starting out with asset savings (red line) allows the government to increase its con-
secutive debt issuances. By contrast, when faced with a favorable income shock, the government
can only start increasing its debt issuances whenever the current debt is much lower. In synthe-
sis, a robust bulk of AA savings provides more access to international funds. e mechanism at
play is that having a large stock of AA today reduces the interest rate of debt, and, as a result,
the government can borrow more sustainable debt in equilibrium.
Figure 1.3c displays the optimal AA savings for the range of debt the government has today.
Whenever the government gets a favorable productivity shock and in situations in which net debt
is −30% or lower the optimal policy is not to hold any AA next period. Instead, the sovereign
uses income and moderate debt to smooth consumption. For low productivity shocks, however,
having AA today is relevant for the government’s ability to smooth consumption. In this case,
starting out with a solid AA buer allows the government to accrue the maximum amount of
AA in the next period for almost all debt levels today. Doing so guarantees the access to funds
to smooth consumption, and guarantees a future return.
Figure 1.3d depicts the value of the objective functions for our three scenarios. As expected,
the value of the objective is largest with a high income shock. In addition, starting out with
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aachable assets is utility improving for all levels of debt today. For the same income and debt, a
large stock of AA today reduces the costs of funds, granting the government the ability to smooth
consumption.
Figure 1.3: Optimal Default, Debt, AA and Value Functions
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1.7.2 Model Mechanisms: Varying α and θ
e following gures depict the long-run equilibrium, based on the invariant distribution. ey
aim at conveying how the model mechanisms work by investigating how varying the aachabil-
ity parameter and the probability of redemption aect the long-run equilibrium outcomes.
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An eective threat of aachability deters default, particularly when the probability of redemp-
tion is high. (see Figure 1.4a). e exclusion rate is highest whenever the incentives to repay
are weak: the sovereign expects to be in nancial autarky for a short period of time in case of
default, and the threat of aachability is low. However, as α increases, even if the probability of
redemption is high, long run default rates are much less frequent — close to 0.5% of the time —.
Figure 1.4: Model Mechanisms: Varying α and θ
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(a) Equilibrium Exclusion rate
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(b) Equilibrium Net Debt
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.50.6
0.7
0.0
2.5
5.0
7.5
10.0
12.5
15.0
AA if not excluded (% GDP)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
(c) Equilibrium AA holdings
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(d) Equilibrium Interest Rate
ere are two model mechanisms at play here. First, for low enoughα , AA holdings reduce debt
sustainability (see Figure 1.4c and Figure A.3), because, as previously discussed, having saving
buers makes default more aractive. Second, for a very low probability of redemption (regard-
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less of the aachability parameter), the sovereign holds a very large stock of debt. At these levels
of debt, it is optimal for the sovereign to default at nonzero rates.
Equilibrium debt behaves as expected with variations in α and θ (see Figure 1.4b and Fig-
ure A.2). Debt (in absolute value) is increasing in the aachability parameter, and decreasing in
θ . Two factors explain this. e rst is borrowing costs. In the α −θ region where default is likely
(north-west corner), the cost of funds decreases very fast in α . e second is the punishment for
defaulting. With higher aachability and lower probability of redemption, the harsher the pun-
ishment for defaulting, and the larger the incentives to repay become. us, in equilibrium, there
is more demand for bonds. In addition, the sovereign holds more AA for higher levels of α . us,
as conscation costs are higher, the government is, in eect, more credible, and is able to issue
larger levels of debt. Debt is more sensible to θ than α . is, as the repeated impact of α depends
on the probability of redemption.
Aachable asset holdings are highly non-linear in the aachability parameter (see Figure 1.4c).
Two contradictory mechanisms explain this paern. On the one hand, for low enough α , having
AA holdings reduces the cost of being excluded from the international capital markets, resulting
in large aachable asset holdings in equilibrium. On the other hand, with aachability, debt
sustainability rises (incentives to default diminish). us, at largerα values, the government saves
in AA, earns the risk-free rate every period, and is beer able to smooth future consumption.
As expected, the equilibrium interest rate increases with the probability of redemption, and
decreases — though very slightly — with aachability (Figure 1.4d).
1.7.3 Calibrated Results
Median aachable asset holdings, as mentioned in the introduction, remained stable for the 1980s
and most of the 1990s (see Figure 1.2). Since then, data show that AA holdings doubled. At the
same time, starting in the mid-1990s, the number of lawsuits involving aachability aempts
grew sixfold (Schumacher et al., 2018). I calibrate α to test the hypothesis of whether tighter
threats of aachability can partly explain for the recent surge in AA. e calibration of the aver-
age median AA holdings was determined for two points in time: pre-1997 and 2010. e optimal
α is that which minimizes the squared percent deviation of the model-implied AA and the median
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observed AA.
Table 1.2 displays the calibrated α for each period. If aachability were the only factor explain-
ing the rise in AA holdings since 1997, this model would predict a more than ninefold increase in
the fraction of assets that could be seized to compensate the lender. Aachability was 10% before
1997, and 93% in 2010. e predicted change in aachability is able to predict the upward trend
in AA holdings observed in the data (see Figure 1.5). e model is also able to match observed
AA holdings for the pre-1997 period. For 2010, the model-implied values of AA is 1 percentage
point below the observed value, though within the 30th percentile and 70th percentile.
Table 1.2: Calibrated α : Beginning/End Period
Period Start (80s-90s) Period End (2010)
α : Fraction of AA aached 0.10 0.93
Implied % debt aached 3.5% 34.2%
More interesting, however, is the model-implied percentage of debt aached (second row of
Table 1.2). To contextualize, a country that owed $100 worth of debt in 1997, could expect $3.5
worth of aachable assets to be conscated. However, in 2010, a country with that same level
of debt could expect to have $34.2-worth of AA seized. Externally validating α or the implied
percentage of debt aached is dicult, due to lack of data. One can only rely on case studies.
Schumacher et al. (2018) relate relentless litigation and severe threats of aachability with lower
investor losses or haircuts 6. e authors display post-2010 cases for which repayments and set-
tlements ended up favoring holdouts or creditors (See Table A.1). For all cases, the governments’
initial repayment proposals were rejected by holdouts or creditors, and, following legal disputes,
investor haircuts were lower.
It is worth noting that the implied percentage of debt aached as presented here is a lower
bound of what could potentially be aached. is because for each period the government is in
default, it gets a fraction α of its stock of AA conscated. e number of periods the government
is in nancial autarky is stochastic, and given by θ . us, the total fraction of debt aached can
be larger than the one-time penalty (34.2%).
6A haircut is the comparison between the present value of the original debt to the present value of re-negotiated
debt
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Figure 1.5: Observed and Model Implied Aachable Asset as % GDP
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What is the model mechanism that explains why it is optimal for countries to hold more AA?
As explained in the previous section, aachability increases the incentives to repay debt. In
equilibrium, the government can access more funds. At the same time, saving in the form of
AA yields the risk-free rate the next period. erefore, with higher incentives to repay, the
sovereign decides to increase its AA holdings, earn the risk-free rate of return, and smooth future
consumption.
1.8 Conclusions
In this paper, I construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of optimal default, in
which the government optimally holds net debt and aachable assets. e model contributes to
the literature by allowing for the possibility of debt to be enforced. is is a vast improvement
upon previous models that nd that the optimal level of assets the sovereign chooses in the long
run is zero. In my model, asset savings have other roles other than consumption smoothing.
ey impact repayment incentives and borrowing costs. At the end of the day, whenever debt is
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enforceable through a fraction of assets that can be conscated should the government default,
equilibrium AA-holdings can be dierent than zero (depending on parameter conguration).
Specically, I nd that AA holdings and aachability, increase debt sustainability, and, further,
they provide access to funds. As hypothesized, default becomes less likely as the aachabil-
ity parameter become higher and/or as the probability of redemption falls. In addition, for this
same parameter combination, debt is the lowest, and the equilibrium interest rate decreases in
aachability. Nonetheless, the responsiveness of the long-run interest rate occurs for parameter
combinations in which default is likely, i.e., the combination of almost zero aachability and a
high probability of redemption.
I calibrate α to minimize the squared percent deviation of the model-implied AA holdings to
that observed in the data. Results indicated that there was a ninefold increase in aachability from
the late 1990s to 2010. e change in α = .1 to α = .93, allows me to match the observed rising
trend in AA holdings since the late 1990s. e model does well at matching pre-1997 and 2010
median aachable asset holdings. e implied percent of debt that could be aached rose from
3.5 percent to 34.5 percent in the same period. Larger aachability — which can be interpreted as
relentless litigation, severe threats of conscation, and less favorable rulings toward sovereigns
— explains the rise in the percentage of debt aached and aachable asset holdings.
ough the model and calibration have several shortcomings, these can be the focus of future
research. First, a cubic spline could be used to compute the value function, instead of using a grid
(as in Hatchondo et al. (2010)). Second, one can aim at matching, not only AA holdings but also
debt. For last, both α and θ could be calibrated.
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Chapter 2
Government Financial Assets and Debt Sustainability
Co-authored with Nelson Sobrinho, Senior Economist at the IMF†.‡
2.1 Introduction
is paper analyzes the impact of government nancial assets on two key dimensions of sovereign
debt sustainability—borrowing costs and probability of debt distress1. Do assets help reduce bor-
rowing costs and the likelihood of debt crises? If so, does the impact depend on assets char-
acteristics (e.g., liquidity) and the sovereign’s creditworthiness? Are some assets more useful
for mitigating liquidity risks, and others for reducing solvency concerns? Although the impor-
tance of government assets for debt sustainability has been acknowledged by policymakers and
practitioners (e.g., IMF (2011b, 2013, 2016b)), very lile research has been done to answer these
questions. is paper aempts to shed light on these issues, which are relevant not only for
policymakers but also for debt and asset managers, debt sustainability analysts, and investors.
Why may government assets maer? Like international reserves, assets are a self-insurance
device that facilitate shiing government income across time and states of nature. For instance,
assets can serve as scal buers to be used in times of distress to mitigate liquidity and solvency
risks. ese buers can support the implementation of counter-cyclical scal policies during
†e views expressed in this chapter are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the
IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.
‡Originally published as an IMF Working Paper (WP/17/173), under the title “Government Financial Assets and
Debt Sustainability”. It is reproduced here with permission of the IMF’s Copyrights Oce.
1For brevity, we refer to ‘government assets’ or simply ‘assets’ throughout this paper. We focus on assets held
by the scal authority or sovereign wealth funds but also control for the international reserves held by the central
bank. We also use the convention that an “asset category” is a group of collection or asset instruments (e.g., assets
held in debt instruments). An “asset instrument” corresponds to the statistical denition ( GFSM 2014, ESA 2010,
SNA 2008, PSDS 2013) of the underlying nancial instrument in which the asset is held (e.g., loans, equity & shares).
When there is no ambiguity, we may use the two terms interchangeably.
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economic downturns, particularly in countries that are vulnerable to sharp uctuations in com-
modity prices.
Assets can also work as a signaling device for developing economies. For instance, they can
serve as collateral for creditors, and be used to signal responsible scal policies and hence es-
tablish good reputation and track record. In short, assets can improve market access conditions
and reduce the likelihood of debt distress both in ex-ante and ex-post sense. However, there may
be circumstances where assets are not always fully useful and markets will internalize these in
their lending decisions. Assets may not be available for immediate liquidation (e.g., for political
reasons, or encumbered to cover future liabilities); may not be properly valued (e.g., a non-traded
equity stake or loan whose market price is substantially lower than the book value); or may not
be suciently liquid ().
We rely on two dierent approaches to address the above questions. We use quantile regres-
sions to investigate the impact of government assets on the conditional distribution of sovereign
bond spreads. is allows to uncover the possibly dierentiated eect of asset holdings across
the distinct quantiles of sovereign risk, and hence whether assets may improve market access
conditions through the borrowing cost channel. Second, we use binary response models to mea-
sure the impact of government assets on the conditional probability of debt distress. is allows
to understand whether assets are relevant for mitigating the likelihood of debt distress and hence
for reducing the large economic costs associated with crises.
We start our investigation by assembling a comprehensive database on assets from several
data repositories inside and outside the IMF. is database includes detailed information by asset
instruments from government balance sheets as well as aggregate time series, and covers 110
advanced and emerging economies going as far back as the 1980s.
Second, we identify several stylized facts on the behavior of government assets at the cross-
sectional (i.e., across asset instruments) and time series dimensions: advanced economies (AMs)
typically have larger assets holdings than emerging economies (EMs); the cross-country distri-
bution of assets is wide and skewed to the right; equity stakes are the largest asset instrument
(almost half of total holdings); and assets behave pro-cyclically in EMs, that is, EMs tend to ac-
cumulate assets in good times and use them in times of distress to smooth the impact of market
access loss and business cycle uctuations.
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Turning to the econometric analysis, the quantile regressions suggest that assets reduce sovereign
borrowing costs in EMs, more so for countries with spreads at the top quantiles of the distribu-
tion of sovereign spreads. In addition, our probit regressions suggest that assets may signicantly
reduce the likelihood of debt distress in EMs, in some cases oseing and even outweighing the
impact of gross debt. ese results broadly hold for all asset categories considered in this paper,
including the more liquid ones. As expected, assets maer less for AMs, perhaps because mar-
ket participants pay more aention to their stronger policies, institutions and macroeconomic
fundamentals. In a nutshell, the results indicate that accumulating liquid assets may particularly
benet EMs that are perceived as riskier by investors. Our key ndings survive several robustness
checks and do not seem to be an artifact of the data or econometric specications.
e paper provides several contributions to the existing literature. To our knowledge, we
are the rst to consider the role of distinct assets categories on borrowing costs and default
probability. We also relax the assumption that gross debt and assets have the same (opposite)
eect, and allow for a potentially dierent impact of more granular asset categories on those two
dimensions of debt sustainability. Dierent from previous studies that focus on either advanced
(mostly OECD) economies or emerging markets, we use information on assets for the two groups
and estimate the impact of assets across the spread distribution, without having to slice the data
and induce unnecessary bias in our estimations. Moreover, we nd that assets reduce risks to
debt sustainability in EMs but less so in AMs, and that asset characteristics (notably liquidity)
also maer.
e rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature review. Section
3 discusses our identication strategies. Section 4 describes the data and identify stylized facts.
Section 5 presents and discusses the results. Section 6 suggests some policy implications. Section
7 concludes.
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2.2 Literature Review
Our work is related to two major strands of the empirical literature. First, to the strand on the
determinants of sovereign bond spreads and market access. In this branch, most studies focus on
the role of gross debt and typically nd a positive correlation between gross debt and long-term
interest rates or spreads. For instance, Edwards (1986), Eichengreen and Mody (1998) Eichengreen
and Mody (2000), Borensztein and Panizza (2008), Gelos et al. (2011), Comelli (2012), and Cruces
and Trebesch (2013). ere is a handful of work in the rst branch that aempts to uncover the
role of assets on the behavior of interest rates (or spreads). However, they typically focus on
net debt, implicitly assuming that gross debt and assets have similar impact (but with opposite
sign) on borrowing costs. Probably because of data availability, these studies usually cover OECD
countries, the Euro area, or another sub-set of advanced economies. For example, Ford and Laxton
(1999), Conway and Orr (2002), Chinn and Frankel (2005), and Gruber and Kamin (2012), Ichiue
and Shimizu (2015).
Noteworthy,Gruber and Kamin (2012) nd a robust and signicantly positive impact of net
debt on long-term bond yields of OECD countries. Our work is close to but diers from Gruber
and Kamin’s in three relevant aspects. While they focus on OECD countries, use bond yields as
dependent variable, and introduce net debt as a key control variable; we consider a large sample
of both AMs and EMs, also investigate the likelihood of debt crisis as dependent variable, and
allow assets and gross debt to have a distinct impact on our dependent variables.
Ichiue and Shimizu (2015) go one step further and explore the separate role of assets. ey
explain the behavior of government long-term forward rates for ten AMs using standard country
fundamentals (e.g., ination expectations, labor productivity growth, current account, foreign
borrowing, primary balance, and demographics) as well net and gross debt. ey nd that net
debt is relevant for explaining forward rates but assets are not. As we show in Section 5, the
laer is consistent with our own ndings for AMs.
Hadzi-Vaskov and Ricci (2017) cover both AMs and EMs, with a special focus on the laer, and
is the closest study to our paper. Like us, they allow for a distinct impact of gross debt and assets
on spreads and nd that both have signicant eects on spreads but the eects roughly oset
each other. Considering this evidence, they conclude that net debt is an appropriate measure for
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assessing the impact of indebtedness on spreads. Our results also show that net debt maers for
sovereign spreads and the probability of default. But they also suggest that the eects of gross
debt and assets may not necessarily oset each other depending on the asset category. For the
more liquid assets, we nd that assets have a larger impact than gross debt on spreads and the
probability of default.
e second strand of the empirical literature, to which our work is also related, focuses on the
determinants of the probability of nancial crises in developing and emerging economies. For
instance, Manasse and Schimmelpfennig (2003), Kraay and Nehru (2006), Baldacci et al. (2011),
and Catao and Milesi-Ferrei (2014). To our knowledge, this strand of the literature has also paid
lile aention to the role of assets (beyond international reserves) in mitigating the likelihood of
debt crises. ese studies rely on early warning signal approaches or binary dependent models
and typically nd that larger levels of gross debt and international nancial volatility lead to
higher likelihood of crises in EMs. ey also nd that stronger fundamentals that are typically
associated with beer capacity to repay (e.g., adequate reserve coverage, robust growth, lower
current account decits) also reduce the probability of nancial crises in EMs.
Finally, our work is related to the strand of theoretical literature of optimal default models
with international nancial assets. ese models explain the apparent paradox of governments
of issuing debt and holding international reserves. It is usually the case that indebted countries
borrow with a penalty to compensate for default risk, while they could maintain net liabilities by
reducing debt by the same amount of reserves, and decreasing interest payments. Most studies
nd that the rationale for holding international reserves is for self-insurance motives, as hedge
against external shocks or rollover risks, and as a signal of lower default probabilities and of
larger repayments in case of default (see for instance Alfaro and Kanczuk (2013, 2009), Bianchi
et al. (2012) and Tavares (2015)).
Our estimations control for the level of international reserves but do not specically explore
their role on debt sustainability or potential interactions with assets. However, our contribution
to the literature in this regard is to show that over and beyond reserves, assets contain useful
information for predicting the behavior of sovereign spreads and default probability. It is also
worth noting that assets and reserves help achieve complementary goals, i.e. scal and external
sustainability. Both are self-insurance devices, and can serve as collateral and signaling devices,
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allowing countries to borrowing at lower rates and be less prone to debt distress.2
2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 A Simple Economic Model
In this subsection, we briey discuss the economic rationale guiding our identication strategy.
To illustrate the two channels of interest, we assume that a sovereign issues one-period bonds
that are bought by risk neutral international investors (see Edwards (1986) and followers, e.g.,
Comelli (2012)). e sovereign’s borrowing cost is pinned down by the lender’s breakeven con-
dition which depends on the opportunity cost of funds, i.e., the world risk-free rate R∗, and the
sovereign’s probability of default p:3
pi,t (θRi,t ) + (1 − pi,t )Ri,t = R∗t
where R is the sovereign’s gross borrowing rate, and θ is the lender’s recovery rate in default
states (equivalently, h = 1 − θ is the lender’s haircut). e spread over the risk-free rate is a
non-linear and increasing function of the probability of default:
sit =
hpi,t
1 − hpi,t
R∗t . (2.1)
e sovereign spread is also increasing in the haircut, consistent with the empirical evidence
(e.g., Cruces and Trebesch (2013). Following the tradition in the theoretical and empirical litera-
ture, we assume that the probability of default is a function of a vectorX of country fundamentals
that proxy for the sovereign’s creditworthiness as well as global or push factors. We assume that
the probability of default also depends on government assets A:
2For a discussion on the role of international reserves see, for instance, Aizenman and Marion (2004) and Jeanne
and Rancie`re (2011).
3is simple setup assumes that from an individual lender’s perspective the probability of default and the coun-
try’s borrowing rate are given. In a somewhat similar environment, Neumeyer and Perri (2005) motivate country-
specic and time-varying spreads by assuming that in each period there is a probability that the government will
conscate all debt service going from local borrowers to foreign lenders.
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pit = p (Ait ,Xit ). (2.2)
Equations (2.1) and (2.2) thus suggest two complementary ways for estimating the impact of
assets on market access conditions. One can assess this impact on the country risk premium or
the default probability or both as we do in this paper. We assume that the country spread is a
linear function of assets and fundamentals and then move on to explore non-linearities through
quantile regressions. Next, we assume the normal distribution for the default probability and
estimate this last equation using a probit model.
2.3.2 Financial Assets and Sovereign Risk
To understand how assets aect sovereign spreads we estimate equation (2.3) below. We assume
that Λ′Xit = Λ1bit−1+Λ′2Zit−1+Λ3Wt , where b is gross debt-to-GDP ratio, Z is a vector of country
fundamentals andW is a vector of global factors.
spreadit = αi + βAssetsit−1 + Λ′Xit + eit . (2.3)
Following the empirical literature—e.g., Edwards (1986), Eichengreen and Mody (1998), Boren-
sztein and Panizza (2008), Bellas and Petrova (2010), Comelli (2012), Cruces and Trebesch (2013),
and Catao and Milesi-Ferrei (2014)—Z includes real GDP growth, reserves-to-GDP ratio, current
account balance-to-GDP ratio, ination rate, and unexpected shocks to country credit ratings.
e laer are proxied by the residuals of regressing credit ratings on macroeconomic fundamen-
tals, the U.S. interest rate, and the country’s history of debt default and restructurings (e.g.,Cruces
and Trebesch (2013)) which would indirectly reect creditor losses. Lastly, in the baseline spec-
ications W is given by the VIX which controls for changes in international investors’ aitude
towards risk.
e two key coecients of interest from equation (2.3) are β(on assets) and Λ1 (on gross debt).
We expect Λ1 to be positive as in the literature, and β to be negative. All else equal, we expect
countries with higher debt-to-GDP and lower asset-to-GDP ratios—i.e., higher net debt—to face
larger sovereign spreads and higher probability of debt distress. In other words, we expect that
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asset holdings mitigate the risk of debt distress and reduce borrowing costs.
Notice that we allow for a distinct impact of assets and gross debt on sovereign spreads. Alter-
natively, we could have estimated (2.3) by imposing the restriction that Λ1 = −β . In that case, as
in Gruber and Kamin (2012), only net debt—dened as gross debt net of nancial assets— would
be included in the regression. Our identication strategy is thus more exible, and allows to test
whether assets further help explain variations in sovereign spreads and in the default probability
once debt is considered.
Here we are particularly interested in investigating whether assets maer for emerging economies,
as these might use assets as a signaling device. Equation (2.4) augments specication (2.3) to in-
clude an emerging market (EM) categorical variable and an interaction term as follows:4
spreadit = αi + βAssetit−1 + γAssetit−1EM + δEM + Λ′Xit + eit . (2.4)
Both specications are estimated using panel data techniques (with xed eects and clustered
standard errors) and ordinary least squares. Due to the nature of the estimation strategy, the
coecients of interest, β and β + γ , reect the marginal impact of assets at the mean of the
sovereign spread distribution. But assets’ marginal impact is likely to vary depending on the
country’s relative position in that distribution. Intuitively, a marginal increase in assets would
maer more for riskier countries (say, those at the 90th percentile of the risk distribution) than
for ‘safer’ countries (e.g., those at the median).
We thus investigate whether assets’ marginal impact diers depending on the country’s rela-
tive position in the sovereign spread distribution, i.e., whether the impact of assets on spreads is
nonlinear. Specically, we let the parameters of interest vary across the conditional distribution
of spreads. e analogous of equations (2.3) and (2.4) are estimated via pooled quantile regression.
e model is specied as in equations (2.5) and (2.6), respectively:
Qspreadit (τ ) = α (τ ) + β (τ )Assetit−1 + Λ(τ )
′Xit , (2.5)
4We interacted the EM dummy with gross debt but the estimated coecient was statistically non-signicant
most of the time. is result also suggests that gross debt maers equally for both AMs and EMs, a fact considered
by the Fund’s debt sustainability frameworks.
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and
Qspreadit (τ ) = α (τ ) + β (τ )Assetit−1 + γ (τ ) (Assetit−1EM ) + δ (τ )EM + Λ(τ )
′Xit . (2.6)
Since quantile regressions measure the magnitude of the impact at various points of the risk-
perception distribution, the above specications allow to investigate whether government assets
are particularly relevant for countries facing higher borrowing costs. e coecients of interest
in (2.5) and (2.6) are β (τ ) and β (τ ) + γ (τ ), respectively.
2.3.3 Financial Assets and Probability of Debt Distress
To estimate the impact of assets on the likelihood of debt distress we rely on the same controls
used in the panel data and pooled quantile regressions. We use a pooled probit model to estimate
the conditional probability of debt distress as specied in equations (2.7) and (2.8):
P (y = 1|Assetsit ,Xit ) = Φ(α + βAssetsit + Λ′Xit , (2.7)
and
P (y = 1|Assetsit ,Xit ) = Φ(α + βAssetsit + γ (AssetsitEM ) + δEM + Λ′Xit , (2.8)
where P (·) denotes probability of debt distress, and Φ(cdot ) the standard normal CDF. In the
event of debt distress the variable y takes the value of one (zero otherwise). e vector Xit is
dened exactly as before. Like Catao and Milesi-Ferrei (2014), we use pooled data to prevent
countries that never experienced a debt distress from being dropped from the sample thereby fo-
cusing on the cross-section dimension, and to mitigate the incidental parameter problem aecting
xed eects estimates.
In our baseline denition of sovereign debt distress, a debt crisis is triggered by an outright
default (either on domestic or external debt), a debt restructuring or a near-default situation
proxied by IMF nancing exceeding one hundred per cent of quota on a commitment basis. We
impose the condition that a debt distress episode must not be preceded by another episode ending
in any of the two previous years to avoid counting as single crises those episodes that are part of
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a longer spell of debt distress.
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Sample
Our sample comprises 110 market-access countries (30 AMs and 80 EMs), in line with the country
coverage in the IMF’s debt sustainability framework for market-access countries. We collect
data on assets for this sample from several data sources inside and outside the IMF and all asset
categories going back to the 1980s. Figure 2.1 summarizes the dierent assets instruments based
on balance sheet data (see further details in the Appendix).
Figure 2.1: Description of Financial Asset Categories
e categories from balance sheet data are presented in increasing order of liquidity. e
most comprehensive (hence less liquid) asset category is total nancial assets. It includes all
nancial assets reported in the balance sheet of the government. Assets held in debt instruments
exclude equity and shares and nancial derivatives, and is the asset counterpart of gross debt. e
categories labeled liquid and highly liquid encompass currency & deposits plus debt securities,
and only currency & deposits, respectively.
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Data for constructing these asset categories are obtained from OECD, Eurostat and the IMF’s
Government Finance Statistics Yearbook (GFSY) databases. For each country, we use the available
data with the longest time coverage. Assets are typically held by the general or central govern-
ment, and exclude international reserves at the central bank and non-nancial assets such as
buildings and land.5 Assets may be held domestically or abroad (e.g., through sovereign wealth
funds) and denominated in domestic or foreign currency. We also collected data on assets from
the IMF’s WEO as reported by IMF country desks, and data on government deposits as measured
by monetary surveys and reported to the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.6 Following the
literature and to avoid loss of observations, we use debt and assets as ratios to nominal GDP.
Panel-data unit-root tests suggest that assets and gross debt (as ratios of GDP) are stationary in
our sample. e Appendix describe in details the data sources, coverage, and the asset categories
used in the estimations.
Sovereign spreads are measured by JP Morgan EMBI spreads, complemented with data on long-
term spreads from other sources. For non-EMBI countries, spreads are the dierence of long-term
bond yields with respect to the corresponding bond yield in the United States (for non-European
countries), or Germany (for European countries).
Data on the signals of distress come from IMF sta and several other sources, including Rein-
hart and Rogo (2011) (domestic defaults), Das et al. (2012) (restructuring of debt held by ocial
creditors),Cruces and Trebesch (2013) (restructuring of debt held by private foreign creditors)
and Catao and Milesi-Ferrei (2014) (external defaults).
e selection of the control variables for the quantile and probit regressions was based on a
literature survey about the determinants of sovereign bond spreads and likelihood of debt crises
(Table B.2). Table B.1 shows an overview of controls included in similar studies.
5Section 2 provided an overview of overlapping issues with international reserves. For a discussion on non-
nancial assets please refer to Bova et al (2013).
6While the data from monetary surveys has beer time coverage than data from balance sheets, reporting stan-
dards were not uniform until 2001 thus constraining time series analysis and cross-country comparisons. More
information about this dataset and related results are available upon request.
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2.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 shows descriptive statistics for net debt and the ve country-specic controls used in
the baseline specications. While EMs have lower asset holdings (see Table 2), they also tend to
carry lower gross debt and hence lower net debt than AMs. EMs tend to hold larger international
reserves and grow faster than AMs, while their other fundamentals (current account balance,
ination and creditworthiness) tend to perform worse.
Table 2.1: Net Debt and Baseline Controls: Descriptive Statistics, 1980-2015
Net debt/GDP based on Gross Debt/GDP
Variable Total Assets Assets in debt instruments Liquid assets Highly liquid assets
AM EM All AM EM All AM EM All AM EM All AM EM All
Obs 543 291 834 540 296 836 540 291 831 540 290 830 1043 2482 3525
Mean 18.0 2.4 12.6 37.4 20.5 31.4 52.0 31.0 44.6 57.5 32.0 48.6 60.0 49.6 52.7
Median 27.6 3.6 18.1 40.7 18.7 33.0 52.1 29.6 41.9 55.0 30.1 45.2 54.8 40.6 44.4
Real GDP Growth CAB/GDP Reserves/GDP Ination Credit ratings
Variable AM EM All AM EM All AM EM All AM EM All AM EM All
Obs 1048 2601 3649 970 2470 3440 1038 2437 3475 1043 2546 3589 1019 2439 3458
Mean 2.7 3.8 3.5 0.2 -1.2 -0.8 13.9 17.6 16.5 5.6 38.0 28.5 77.9 40.9 51.8
Median 2.6 3.9 3.5 -0.5 -2.3 -1.7 7.0 12.6 11.2 2.6 6.0 4.5 82.6 39.4 51.0
e database has more observations on assets for AMs, despite the larger number of EMs in
the sample (Table 2.2). But in both groups, mean asset holdings exceed the median (the asset
distribution is skewed to the right). ere is also a wide disparity in asset holdings across coun-
tries with a few countries (mostly commodity exporters) having the largest asset positions. To
illustrate, the asset portfolio of the top asset holder in the sample (Norway) is about ten times
larger than the sample mean.
Table 2.2: Asset Holdings by Category and Country Group, 1980-2015
(Percent of GDP)
Variable Total In debt instruments Liquid Highly liquidAM EM All AM EM All AM EM All AM EM All
Obs 543 291 834 540 296 836 540 291 831 540 290 830
Mean 47.4 37.1 43.8 27.2 19.1 24.3 12.6 8.6 11.2 7.1 7.6 7.3
Median 37.4 32.8 36.4 20.7 16.0 19.4 8.2 7.3 7.9 5.1 6.4 5.6
In terms of size, the largest asset instruments are equity and shares, followed by accounts
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receivable, and currency and deposits. Roughly similar paern is observed in both AMs and EMs
(Table 2.3).
Table 2.3: Asset Holdings by Category and Instrument
(Percent of GDP)
Asset category and instrument Median 1980-2015
AMs EMs
By category
Total 47.4 37.1
Held in debt instruments 27.2 19.1
Liquid nancial assets 12.6 8.6
Highly liquid 7.1 7.6
By Instrument
A1 Monetary gold and SDRs 0.05 0.03
A2 Currency and deposits 7.1 7.6
A3 Debt securities 5.6 1.1
A4 Loans 7.1 4.6
A5 Equity and investment fund shares 19.7 17.6
A6 Insurance, pension, and standardized guarantee schemes 0.11 0.01
A7 Financial derivatives 0.1 0.1
A8 Other accounts receivable 7.4 7.2
Assets and gross debt tend to be countercyclical in AMs and roughly acyclical in EMs in the
overall sample, whereas spreads are clearly countercyclical in both groups (see correlations with
growth in Table 4, rst two blocks). is correlation is robust to the way assets and gross debt
are measured, i.e., in levels or rst dierences. e correlation between spreads and gross debt
also has the expected positive sign in EMs.
e apparent acyclicality of assets in EMs is somewhat puzzling. However, since the Global
Financial Crisis (GFC) assets look procyclical and gross debt countercyclical (Figure 2.2, based on
a balanced sample).
Many EMs like Chile, Russia, and Gulf countries used part of their assets accumulated prior
to the crisis to support counter-cyclical scal spending. For instance, Russia drew down from
its Reserve Fund to implement vigorous countercyclical scal stimulus, and liquidity injections
to cover large unhedged foreign exchange positions by the private sector (IMF (2010)). Saudi
Arabia used cash reserves from its sovereign wealth fund (and central bank reserves) to nance
government spending and inject liquidity into the banking system ( Winder (2010)). Other oil-
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Figure 2.2: Growth, Assets, Debt and Spreads during the GFC (median)
producing countries like Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain and Qatar also channeled the proceeds from
oil revenues (i.e., stopped accumulating assets) to fund large non-oil primary decits (e.g.,IMF
(2011a)). In AMs, bailouts of banks and non-nancial corporations during the GFC—in many
cases funded by accumulation of gross debt—expanded both sides of the government balance
sheet (e.g., TALF, TARP, AMLF, Maiden Lane programs in the United States).
e value of some assets owned by commodity-intensive producers is likely to be pro-cyclical,
i.e., it increases in good times when commodity prices are up and declines during crises when
commodity prices go down. Figure 3 illustrates that the market value of commodity-producing
companies that are partially or fully controlled by the government is highly correlated with com-
modity price uctuations. is highlights the exposure of commodity exporters’ wealth to com-
modity price cycles, a risk that many countries nd very dicult to diversify away.7
Table 5 shows that crises are rare events in AMs, with most episodes identied in the sample
occurring in EMs. e average duration of a crisis in EMs is 5 years. As documented in the
literature (e.g., Cruces and Trebesch (2013), and Catao and Milesi-Ferrei (2014)), our denition
of debt distress also implies that sovereign debt crises tend to cluster over time, reecting changes
in global economic and nancial conditions, like the events that triggered the debt crisis of the
1980s, and the debt diculties associated with the recent GFC.
Assets, debt and the relevant macro variables tend to display the expected behavior around
the crises identied in the sample (Figure 2.4). Asset typically decline prior to the crisis and
are rebuilt thereaer, probably reecting scal adjustment to cope with the crisis. Gross debt
increases sharply over the crisis, from about 40 percent of GDP to more than 60 percent of GDP.
All relevant macro variables deteriorate in the run up to the crisis but tend to show some recovery
7e asset price dynamics shown in Figure 2.3 is not fully reected in the balance sheet data, including because
equity is typically recorded at historical value.
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Figure 2.3: Commodity Prices and Equity Value of Commodity-Producing Firms
a few years later. Countries also experience tighter global nancial conditions (as measured by
the VIX) at the onset of the crisis.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Financial Assets and Sovereign Spreads
Table 6 reports the results for the xed eects panel regressions estimated via ordinary least
squares (OLS).8 All coecients on the macro fundamentals have the expected sign and nearly all
are statistically signicant at conventional signicance levels. But the impact of assets on spreads
across the four categories is less systematic, for instance compared with international reserves.
Only the two broader categories (total assets and assets held in debt instruments) add information
to the regressions when controlling for country xed eects and macro fundamentals, and only
for specication (2.3). An F-test for the joint impact of gross debt and assets on spreads suggests
that this impact is not statistically dierent from zero, as in with Hadzi-Vaskov and Ricci (2017).
Next, we estimate pooled quantile regressions (specications 2.5 and 2.6). Figure B.2 - Fig-
ure B.5 and Figure 2.5 summarize the key results, where condence bands describe the quantile
8Given data availability, we are not able to x the sample size across the specications shown in this paper.
38
Figure 2.4: Dynamics Around Debt Distress Episodes in EMs (median values)
coecients and doed lines the OLS analogues. e laer only capture the average impact of
each variable on spreads thus missing the marked nonlinearities synthetized by the quantile co-
ecients. Most estimated coecients have the expected sign and are statistically signicant
across quantiles and asset categories. Note that sovereign spreads tend to react more strongly
to growth, ination and credit ratings in countries that investors perceive as riskier (Figure B.2 -
Figure B.5). Do gross debt and assets behave in the same fashion? is can be seen in Figure 2.5
which presents the results for gross debt (Λ1(τ )) and assets(β (τ ), γ (τ ), and β (τ ) + γ (τ )).
Consistent with the OLS results in Table 2.6, the response of spreads to gross debt is positive
and increasing in country risk, as expected. e marginal impact of assets on spreads, β (τ ),
is either zero or around the OLS average in the case of advanced economies. is result can
be interpreted in several ways. First, the signaling role of assets is probably less relevant for
AMs as a group than for EMs, given their stronger institutions, policies, and capacity to repay.
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Second, assets should maer even less for countries with reserve or quasi-reserve currencies,
which comprise about half of the AM sample if all euro area countries are considered. ird, as
pointed out by Hadzi-Vaskov and Ricci (2017), the interest rates (hence spreads) that maer for
AMs are in local currency, which reduces exposure to the “original sin” and the need for holding
buers against market distress.9 Finally, more ecient debt and cash management and budget
execution may also weaken the correlation between assets and borrowing costs in AMs.
Turning to EMs, the gure shows that the sensitivity of spreads to assets (β (τ ) +γ (τ )) is typi-
cally larger and statistically signicant for countries at higher quantiles of risk and across all asset
categories. Dierent from AMs, assets seem to be particularly useful for facilitating market ac-
cess for the riskiest emerging economies. Hadzi-Vaskov and Ricci (2017) also nd that sovereign
spreads become more responsive to asset positions in high-spread countries facing market stress.
However, since they rely on panel OLS regressions, they could not explore the spread variation
across the entire distribution as we do.
Worth highlighting, a 10-percentage point (pp) increase in assets by an EM at the 90th per-
centile of risk would reduce sovereign spreads by 60–100bps, compared to 0-50bps for a country
around the median of the distribution. In principle, this strategy could be nanced by issuing
gross debt because the joint impact of debt and assets is typically negative and signicant at
higher quantiles of risk (results available upon request).
e evidence thus far conrms our prior that government assets, including the more liquid
ones, reduce debt sustainability risks. Very liquid assets are beer suited for mitigating macroe-
conomic shocks, including to interest rates, exchange rates, and commodity prices. In many EMs
with constrained access to hedging instruments and where domestic debt markets are not a vi-
able source of nancing, more liquid assets can be deployed against liquidity pressures and debt
service diculties. ese assets may also be less subject to maturity mismatches, be more readily
available and priced by investors more easily.
In theory, governments cannot borrow boundlessly or run Ponzi schemes. But in practice could
governments increase their liquid asset buers through debt accumulation and still benet from
lower borrowing costs? Well-targeted asset-liability management strategies can conceivably re-
duce borrowing costs even if the level of net debt remains unchanged (see Das et al. (2012) for a
9On the original sin, see Hausmann and Panizza (2003), and Eichengreen et al. (2007).
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Figure 2.5: Marginal Eect of Debt and Assets on Spreads (le to right): Λ1(τ ), β (τ ), γ (τ ),
β (τ ) + γ (τ ))
(a) Total assets
(b) Assets held in debt instruments
(c) Liquid assets
(d) Highly liquid assets
detailed discussion on sovereign liability and asset management practices). For instance, a gov-
ernment could borrow long term to improve its debt prole (i.e., increase the average maturity
of its gross debt) or buy precautionary liquid buers to meet nancing needs in the near and
medium term. While net debt remains the same under the two strategies, they still could reduce
average borrowing costs if investors’ perceptions and market conditions prevailing at the time
of new borrowing are favorable enough.
However, it is dicult to imagine a situation where governments could systematically explore
an asset-nanced-by debt strategy. For instance, if the average interest rate on newly issued
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debt exceeds the average return on the assets purchased, as suggested by theory and historical
experience, the strategy could lead to signicant deterioration of the scal balance and even
become unsustainable in the long run.10
2.5.2 Robustness of the Results for Sovereign Spreads
We run alternative specications replacing VII with measures of international risk-free rates,
term-premia, and US corporate high yield as in Cruces and Trebesch (2013), but none dominated
the baseline. We also controlled for the country’s track record of default and debt restructuring
but this variable was typically not statistically signicant and oen had the wrong sign. is
counterintuitive result may in part be explained by the availability of asset data (which constrains
the use of all information on past defaults and restructurings in the regression sample).
To mitigate this problem and test whether our results hold over a longer sample period, we
estimate equations (2.4) and (2.6) using information on assets from the WEO database. e results
based on the OLS regressions show that assets in EMs have the expected sign and are statistically
signicant (Table B.6). In line with the test results showed in Table 2.1 and with the ndings of
Hadzi-Vaskov and Ricci (2017), the joint impact of gross debt and assets on sovereign spreads is
not statistically dierent from zero. But default history does not seem to maer, aer controlling
for assets and macro fundamentals. e results for the quantile regressions are similar to the
baseline ndings for the other asset categories, i.e., the marginal impact of assets on spreads is
around zero for AMs but tend to be signicant and increasing with risk for EMs (Figure B.6).
Next, we further control for the state of business cycles by also including the output gap (mea-
sured by the Hodrick-Presco lter) but keeping GDP growth in the baseline specications. e
coecient on the output gap is statistically signicant in most quantiles of the distribution of
sovereign spreads, but it typically comes with a positive sign. Mechanically, a positive sign may
be reecting the fact that countries tend to be expanding fast in the run up to a crisis, with the
trough of the cycle typically occurring one year into the crisis (Figure B.10). Economically, a
large positive output gap may be signaling growing vulnerabilities (e.g., an overheated economy
10In practice, even countries with large negative net debt would face non-negligible borrowing costs. To illustrate,
in the last quarter of 2016, Saudi Arabia raised $17.5 billion in the largest bond sale by an EM to date paying 135-
210bps above equivalent maturity U.S. bond yields (proxy for the return on assets).
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driven by scal expansion) rather than a healthy economic expansion. In any case, the addition
of output gap does not undermine GDP growth nor assets. In fact, the marginal impact of assets
on spreads has the same order of magnitude as in the baseline and its variance is somewhat lower
(Figure B.7).
We also re-estimate the baseline model using observations up to 2007 to test whether the sharp
increase in risk premium during the Global Financial Crisis is aecting the results. e ndings
still hold for assets held in debt instruments and highly liquid forms at the top quantiles of the
spread distribution (Figure B.8). However, this conclusion should be interpreted with caution
because it is based on a substantially reduced number of observations.
Finally, we estimate equation (2.6) using Hadzi-Vaskov and Ricci (2017)’s parsimonious model
(HVR specication). eir baseline specication is more parsimonious than ours. Besides gross
debt and assets, it only includes growth, ination, VIX and U.S. interest rate. In this exercise, we
use asset data from WEO as they do. e results show the importance of accounting for non-
linearities. Under HVR specication, gross debt seems to maer only at higher quantiles of risk
while assets maer across the entire distribution for EMs (Figure B.9), as in Figure B.6. Interest-
ingly, the dispersion around the marginal impact on spreads for EMs (last panel of Figure B.6) is
smaller than in the baseline, including because of the larger number of observations available for
the HVR specication.
2.5.3 Financial Assets and Probability of Debt Distress
Table 2.7 shows the results for the probit regressions. Most drivers of the probability of debt
distress consistently have the expected sign and are statistically signicant. In line with the
ndings of the literature, gross debt is a key determinant of the likelihood of debt crisis across
all specications and asset categories.
Like in the panel OLS regressions, the coecient on net debt (second column in each block of
Table 2.7) has the same order of magnitude of that on gross debt. is would imply that the order
of magnitude of the coecients on gross debt and assets would be also similar (but with opposite
sign). But a z-test for the joint impact of debt and assets reveals that this conjecture only holds
for total assets and assets held in debt instruments. us, the more liquid asset categories seem
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to exert a disproportionately larger impact than gross debt on the probability of debt distress in
the two empirical models (equations 2.7 and 2.8).
e impact of liquid and highly liquid assets on the probability of debt distress is also eco-
nomically signicant: ceteris paribus and keeping all controls at the mean, a 10-percentage point
increase in both gross debt and assets would reduce the crisis probability by 2-4 pp depending on
the specication. is is compelling evidence that asset liquidity maers and ignoring it in debt
sustainability analyses could lead to incorrect assessments about the likelihood of debt crises in
emerging economies. By lowering the probability of debt distress, these assets would indirectly
help reduce the related and typically large economic costs of default (e.g., output losses).
2.5.4 Liquidity versus Solvency
Is it the case that liquid assets are more useful for mitigating liquidity risks with other assets
(perhaps less liquid) more useful for reducing long-term solvency concerns? While acknowledg-
ing the inherent diculty with identifying liquidity and solvency crises, we change our baseline
denition of debt distress to proxy for these two dimensions. We associate liquidity crises with
episodes that do not involve defaults or deep debt restructurings. More specically, we identify
these episodes with “light” restructurings (i.e., no face value reduction and NPV haircuts below
the sample median), large spikes in bond spreads (i.e., levels above 1000bps or deviations larger
than two standard deviations above historical mean), and large IMF programs (above 100 percent
of quota). We also require that any of these signals do not coincide with deep debt treatments in
the current and next three years. ese criteria allow to identify 156 liquidity episodes, of which
123 in EMs.
We proxy solvency crises with events signaling deep debt treatments: outright defaults on
domestic or external debt, Paris Club restructurings involving face value reduction, and restruc-
turing of commercial debt involving face value reduction and/or NPV haircuts above the sample
median. ese criteria allow to identify 67 episodes, of which 65 in EMs.
Table 2.8 shows the results for the most liquid and for the broadest (thus less liquid) asset cate-
gories. e marginal eect of assets is not strong, but the statistical signicance of the coecients
on assets suggests that highly liquid assets have a larger correlation with liquidity crises than to-
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tal assets, and vice-versa for solvency crises. Intuitively, assets that can be liquidated quickly
should be the most useful for smoothing the impact of sudden market pressures or rollover dif-
culties, whereas assets that are not immediately liquid could still help address solvency risks
over the medium and long term.
2.5.5 Robustness of the Results for the Probability of Debt Distress
As in the quantile regressions, we tested the robustness of the baseline results. It is important
to note that our comprehensive list of controls already raises the bar for assets, i.e., it leaves less
unexplained variations in the dependent variable to be accounted for by assets. Including them
in the regressions also helps mitigate omied variable problems.
But as in the quantile regressions, we also include the output gap in the baseline specica-
tion to further check for omied variable problems. e statistical signicance of the individual
coecients on assets is weaker than in the baseline but the marginal eect on the default prob-
ability is signicant for all but one asset category (Table B.10). e coecient on the output gap
comes with positive sign and is signicant across all asset categories. As mentioned before, a
large positive output gap may be a leading indicator of distress.
To test the robustness of the ndings for EMs, we run the baseline regressions dropping the
observations for advanced economies (Table B.8). Despite the smaller sample, the marginal im-
pact of assets on the probability of debt distress is statistically signicant for all categories but
assets held in debt instruments. Noteworthy, the joint marginal impact of gross debt and assets
for the two liquid categories is stronger than in the baseline regressions, further reinforcing the
view that asset liquidity is an important aribute for reducing risks in EMs.
Finally, we test whether “rare events” is an issue in our sample. Most crises identied since the
1980s do not enter the regressions because the availability of data on assets constrains the size
of the regression sample. e frequency of crisis in the regression sample, i.e., the unconditional
probability of debt distress is quite small (about 2 percent). erefore, crises seem to be rare
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events, potentially leading to small-sample bias.11 We address this issue in two dierent ways.12
First, we broaden the baseline denition of debt distress to also include spikes in sovereign bond
spreads as dened above in Section 5.4. is broader denition is intended to capture instances
of severe market stress including in AMs, which rarely default or restructure debt in our sample.
is allows to identify 149 debt distress episodes, 33 in AMs and 116 in EMs. Under this broad
denition of debt distress, the correlation between gross debt and crisis probability is weaker than
in the baseline because many episodes are triggered by market stress in AMs, which compared
to EMs can sustain higher debt levels and rely less on assets as a signaling device (Table B.9).
e marginal impact of the two measures of liquid assets on the likelihood of crisis in EMs is
statistically signicant, and stronger than in the baseline sample. And so is the joint marginal
impact of gross debt and assets. e estimates imply that a 10-percentage point increase in debt
and assets would reduce the crisis probability by about 6 percentage point in EMs.
Second, we run the probit regressions using the baseline denition of debt distress and WEO
data on assets, taking advantage of the longer time span of the WEO database. e regression
sample includes about 200 additional observations compared to the other asset categories (Ta-
ble B.10). e coecient on assets for the overall sample is statistically signicant but we do not
nd a dierentiated impact for EMs as we did before for the two liquid categories. is probably
reects the fact that WEO data mixes information on liquid and less liquid assets across countries
(see details in the Appendix).
Overall, results of robustness tests suggest that the key baseline result still holds, i.e., assets
(especially those in liquid forms) have a signicant marginal impact on the probability of debt
distress. However, the evidence across all asset categories is less systematic.
11It is well known that maximum likelihood estimation of non-liner regression models with discrete dependent
variable suers from small-sample bias and this bias depends on the number of observations in the less frequent of
the two categories (crisis, no crisis). As note by Allison (2012), “e problem is not specically the rarity of events,
but rather the possibility of a small number of cases on the rarer of the two outcomes. If you have a sample size of
1000 but only 20 events, you have a problem. If you have a sample size of 10,000 with 200 events, you may be OK. If
your sample has 100,000 cases with 2000 events, you’re golden” (hp://statisticalhorizons.com/logistic-regression-
for-rare-events). Also see King and Zeng (2001).
12We also run the baseline model using logistic regression and penalized maximum likelihood estimation (MLE),
which King and Zeng (2001) and others have found to reduce small-sample bias in MLE and mitigate the separation
problem in probit/logistic regressions due to small samples. e coecients on assets for EMs remain with the
expected sign but only that on total assets is statistically signicant.
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2.6 Policy Implications
We use the baseline quantile and probit regressions to derive counterfactual asset levels that
could inform asset-liability management strategies in practice. We assume a country with macro
fundamentals at the median for EMs, and starting with two possible debt levels: 70 and 90 percent
of GDP. e rst benchmark is at the 75th percentile of the gross debt distribution for EMs in
our sample, and treated as a high-risk benchmark in the IMF’s debt sustainability framework for
market-access countries (IMF (2013)). e second is around the 90th percentile of the distribution
and is closely associated with debt distress (1/3 of defaults and restructurings in EMs occurred
at debt levels above 90 percent of GDP in our sample).
We conduct two scenarios. In the rst, we ask the following question: how much assets would
be required to reduce spreads from the 90th percentile of the spread distribution (600 basis points)
to the sample mean (300 bps)? Interestingly, the answer depends more on asset quality than on
initial debt level. e rst panel of Figure 6 shows that the strategy would require asset holdings
around 10-15 percent of GDP for the more liquid categories up to 40-45 percent of GDP if all
possible nancial instruments (liquid and not liquid) are considered.
In the second, we ask: how much assets would be required to reduce the likelihood of debt
distress to the sample mean (5 percent)? e second panel of Figure 6 shows that the answer
depends on both initial debt level and asset quality. An initial debt of 70 percent of GDP would
require asset holdings of 3.5-7.5 percent of GDP, depending on the asset category. However,
because marginal eects are non-linear in the probit model, an initial debt of 90 percent of GDP
would demand larger asset holdings, between 7 percent of GDP for the liquid categories to about
25 percent of GDP for the less liquid ones.
At a broader level, these estimates illustrate that asset quality and policy goals do maer for the
design of asset-liability management strategies. However, the strategy would not be an isolated
policy action. It would probably be accompanied by other measures to improve the scal position
and debt prole. In fact, scal savings could be the only option available for accumulating the
needed asset buers. To the extent that such measures complement each other, the required asset
position could be lower than what the counterfactuals suggest.
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Figure 2.6: Counterfactual Asset Levels Conditional on Initial Gross Debt
2.7 Concluding Remarks
Our investigation makes several contributions to the literature. We consider the role of distinct
assets categories on borrowing costs and default probability. We use information on assets for
both advanced and emerging economies and estimate the impact of assets across the sovereign
spread distribution, without having to slice the data and induce unnecessary bias in our estima-
tions. We nd that assets reduce risks to debt sustainability in EMs, and that asset aributes
(notably liquidity) also maer.
Our investigation started with a linear model and then included quantile regressions to account
for possible nonlinearities. is allowed us to uncover relevant nonlinear eects of assets across
the conditional distribution of spreads. We nd that assets are particularly relevant for reducing
borrowing costs in the riskiest EMs but less so in AMs. We then used a pooled probit to estimate
the impact of assets on the likelihood of debt distress and found that asset liquidity is key for
reducing crisis probability in EMs. Our results survive several robustness checks and do not
seem to be an artifact of the data or econometric specication.
Our results have relevant practical implications. ey add more nuance to standard debt sus-
tainability analyses, showing that the level and prole of government assets also maer, with
more liquid assets playing a more prominent role. erefore, improving tools for scal and debt
sustainability analyses would require paying more aention to government assets, and increasing
the transparency, coverage and reliability of asset data.
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Table 2.4: Pairwise Correlations, 1980-2015
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Table 2.5: Triggers of Debt Crisis in AMs and EMs, 1980-2015
Triggering signal Baseline denitionAMs EMs All
Outright defaults (domestic or external) 0 28 28
Restructurings (ocial and commercial debt) 1 18 19
Financial needs (IMF nancing) 7 48 55
Some combination of the above 1 18 19
All 9 112 121
Average duration in years 3 5 5
Table 2.6: Triggers of Debt Crisis in AMs and EMs, 1980-2015
Controls Gross Net Gross debt Gross debt Gross Net Gross debt Gross debt
debt debt & assets & assets & EMs debt debt & assets & assets & EMs
Total assets Assets held in debt instruments
Debt/GDP, lagged (Λ1) 2.302*** 1.434 2.480*** 2.489*** 2.200*** 2.270*** 2.466*** 2.466***
Assets/GDP, lagged (β ) -0.730 -0.166 -1.455 -0.199
Assets/GDP× EM, lagged (γ ) -2.994*** -4.809***
Real GDP growth, lagged -13.68*** -15.25*** -13.91*** -12.91*** -13.03*** -13.67*** -13.25*** -12.43***
CAB/GDP(3 year avg.),lagged -8.191** -6.308 -7.699** -7.941** -8.552** -7.684** -8.153** -8.442**
Reserves/GDP, lagged -2.421** -2.731*** -2.417*** -2.576*** -2.788*** -2.704*** -2.667*** -2.727***
Ination rate, lagged 14.56*** 14.95*** 14.92*** 16.20*** 9.425** 9.813** 9.713** 10.39**
Country credit ratings, lagged -5.775*** -7.034*** -5.776*** -6.244*** -6.282*** -6.610*** -6.255*** -6.571***
VIX 3.075*** 2.711*** 3.034*** 3.142*** 3.718*** 3.628*** 3.713*** 3.784***
Constant 52.18 199.7*** 73.66 81.27 76.12 133.3*** 93.67* 94.18*
Observations 725 725 725 725 725 725 725 725
R-squared 0.346 0.339 0.350 0.361 0.322 0.324 0.326 0.334
Number of countries 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
F-test for H0: Λ1 + β + γ = 0 4.81** 0.612 0.741 2.727
Liquid assets Highly liquid assets
Debt/GDP, lagged (Λ1) 2.240*** 2.150** 2.305*** 2.349*** 2.240*** 2.142** 2.161** 2.160**
Assets/GDP, lagged (β ) -0.598 0.0214 1.406 1.299
Assets/GDP× EM, lagged (γ ) -4.073 0.474
Real GDP growth, lagged -13.72*** -14.59*** -13.88*** -13.74*** -13.72*** -14.07*** -13.62*** -13.62***
CAB/GDP(3 year avg.),lagged -8.197** -7.496* -8.066** -8.349** -8.197** -8.133** -8.135** -8.131**
Reserves/GDP, lagged -2.476*** -2.269** -2.390** -2.235** -2.476*** -2.261** -2.661** -2.671**
Ination rate, lagged 14.46*** 14.21*** 14.42*** 14.15*** 14.46*** 14.28*** 14.54*** 14.56***
Country credit ratings, lagged -5.876*** -5.955*** -5.801*** -5.562*** -5.876*** -6.114*** -5.875*** -5.895***
VIX 3.100*** 3.092*** 3.118*** 3.118*** 3.100*** 3.089*** 3.074*** 3.073***
Constant 60.44 92.01 61.40 57.78 60.10 83.88 57.03 57.10
Observations 720 720 720 720 719 719 719 719
R-squared 0.346 0.344 0.346 0.349 0.346 0.343 0.347 0.347
Number of countries 52 52 52 52 51 51 51 51
F-test for H0: Λ1 + β + γ = 0 2.304 0.169 2.86* 0.594
***, **, * denote signicant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, based on robust standard errors.
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Table 2.7: Pooled Probit (Dependent Variable: Probability of Debt Distress)
Controls Gross Net Gross debt Gross debt Gross Net Gross debt Gross debt
debt debt & assets & assets & EMs debt debt & assets & assets & EMs
Total assets Assets held in debt instruments
Debt/GDP, lagged (Λ1) 2.125*** 1.656** 2.371*** 2.881*** 1.767*** 1.842** 1.825** 2.274***
Assets/GDP, lagged (β ) -0.945 1.789 -1.982 0.560
Assets/GDP× EM, lagged (γ ) -3.188* -3.707
EM dummy 2.421*** 1.922**
Real GDP growth, lagged -7.243 -8.609 –7.100 -7.254 -8.370* –8.478* -8.525*** -8.777***
CAB/GDP(3 year avg.),lagged -18.33* -18.80*** -19.56*** -24,44*** -16.05*** -15.87*** -15.86** -19.87***
Reserves/GDP, lagged -5.074*** -4.419*** -4.785*** -8.405*** -3.403* -2.385 -2.314 -4.767*
Ination rate, lagged 1.635 5.452** 3.808 3.533 -0.227 -0.0813 -0.0786 -1.187
Country credit ratings, lagged -5.286*** -4.253*** -5.375*** -4.257*** -4.057*** -3.726*** -3.678*** -2.261
VIX 8.961** 6.155*** 8.262** 7.148** 7.907** 7.816** 7.759** 6.686**
Constant -5.481 -4.273*** -5.370*** -7.085*** -4.942*** -4.776*** -4.737*** -5.964***
Observations 712 712 712 712 714 714 714 714
Pseudo R-squared 0.476 0.471 0.486 0.524 0.437 0.447 0.447 0.484
Marginal eect of assets -0.029 -0.075
Marginal eect of assets & debt 0.033 0.031 -0.004 -0.021
Liquid assets Highly liquid assets
Debt/GDP, lagged (Λ1) 2.299*** 2.582*** 2.534*** 2.949** 2.367*** 2.631*** 2.779*** 3.195***
Assets/GDP, lagged (β ) -13.13*** -2.465 -12.35** 0.156
Assets/GDP× EM, lagged (γ ) -15.45** -20.92**
EM dummy 1.998** 2.344**
Real GDP growth, lagged -7.045 -6.951 -9.297* -8.047 -6.941 -6.740 -7.589 -6.356
CAB/GDP(3 year avg.),lagged -19.77*** -20.01*** -20.46*** -22.02*** -20.36*** -20.73*** -21.25** -23.06***
Reserves/GDP, lagged -4.862*** -4.099** -1.006 -3.745 -5.348** -4.632** -1.942 -5.491*
Ination rate, lagged 1.521 1.432 1.312 0.227 1.701 1.672 1.626 0.478
Country credit ratings, lagged -5.626*** -5.708*** -4.672*** -3.544*** -5.984*** -6.088*** -5.457*** -4.280***
VIX 8.269** 8.703** 8.361** 8.220** 8.122** 8.418** 7.944** 7.853**
Constant -5.508*** -5.707*** -5.316*** -6.667*** -5.496*** -5.676*** 5.443*** -6.892***
Observations 709 709 709 709 708 708 708 708
Pseudo R-squared 0.492 0.506 0.528 0.549 0.501 0.513 0.529 0.555
Marginal eect of assets -0.029** -0.448**
Marginal eect of assets & debt -0.24** -0.323** -0.218** -0.379**
***, **, * denote signicant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, based on robust standard errors.
Table 2.8: Pooled Probit (Dependent Variable: Probability of Liquidity and Solvency Crises)
Controls Total Highly liquid Total Highly liquid
assets assets assets assets
Liquidity crisis Solvency crisis
Debt/GDP, lagged 0.0577 0.150 2.123** 1.599
Assets/GDP, lagged 0.323 3.567 -9.816*** 20.62
Assets/GDP× EM, lagged 0.430 -7.613* 7.778* 19.63
EM dummy -0.274 0.574 -1.627 -0.519
Real GDP growth, lagged -7.165*** -7.038*** -19.06*** -17.06***
CAB/GDP(3 year avg.),lagged -4.177 -4.075 -5.087* -2.740
Reserves/GDP, lagged -2.839*** -2.769*** -3.351 -4.230
Ination rate, lagged 1.728 1.888 3.293 0.469
Country credit ratings, lagged -2.616*** -2.233*** -3.170** -3.505**
VIX 4.161** 3.295** 3.346 5.823
Constant -2.415*** -2.511*** -2.100 -3.526
Observations 703 699 743 738
Pseudo R-squared 0.262 0.272 0.671 0.612
Marginal eect of assets 0.035 -0.196 -0.017 -0.01
Marginal eect of assets & debt 0.038 -0.189 0.001 0.006
***, **, * denote signicant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, based on robust standard errors.
51
Chapter 3
Output Dynamics, Fiscal Burden and Banking Crises
“(…) the second vice is lying, the rst is running in debt.” (Benjamin Franklin)1
3.1 Introduction
Are high levels of debt inherently corrosive for output dynamics, economic growth, and nancial
stability? e answer to this question is far from seled. ere is evidence of non-linear eects
of debt on growth; at the same time, there is evidence suggesting that such non-linearities are
not robust to a wide range of modeling choices and data coverage (Rogo and Reinhart (2010),
Pescatori et al. (2014), Panizza and Presbitero (2014) and E´gert (2015), among others).
e ndings seem contradictory. Yet, what if the impact of additional debt changes when a
country’s already existing scal burden (debt-to-tax revenue ratio) becomes suciently corroded
(or suciently ample)? Moreover, what if this dierence becomes crucial during catastrophic
events? On the one hand, the net present benet of lowering debt is high whenever there are
signicant risks of nancial distress. If faced with a high probability of shock, a government
might want to rely on the additional maneuverability to ramp-up debt as a preventive policy.
Whenever debt is already high when a shock occurs, sovereign risk premiums could become
prohibitively high, potentially resulting in a sovereign debt crisis. Also, if the country’s buer is
corroded before a shock, mobilizing resources as a short-term policy might be costly and dicult,
particularly because increasing taxes on short notice is politically and economically dicult. In
this regard, pre-crisis debt should be lowered today, to accomplish dual purposes: to have the
ability to issue short-term debt as countercyclical policy, and to remain within a sustainable debt
path.
1Appears in Franklin’s essay “Way to Wealth”, in Poor Richard’s Almanac in 1758.
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On the other hand, whenever the country has suciently ample scal buers, there are poten-
tially more costs than benets associated with lowering debt during and aer a nancial crisis has
hit. Reducing debt in these circumstances comes at the cost of social benets and other policies
aimed at ramping up aggregate demand.
Take the Great Recession of 2008-09, for example. Compared to peripheral Europe, the United
States had lower initial debt (60.8 percent of GDP in 2008) and was able to implement a larger
stimulus package — 5.9 percent of 2008 GDP — than most of peripheral European countries. In the
United States, the stimulus was e American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, through
which the Federal Reserve bought Long-Term Treasury bonds and other mortgage-backed secu-
rities from private banks (Duca, 2013). Peripheral Europe, on the other hand, started with higher
debt levels, and implemented less stimulus. In Italy, for example, where gross debt was 103.7
percent of GDP in 2008, the stimulus package implemented represented only 0.3 percent of 2008
GDP (Prasad and Sorkin, 2009).
Naturally, the amount of discretionary scal stimulus undertaken by world countries in 2009
varied. is was due to a variety of factors, including the dierent levels of severity of the crisis
in each country, the dierences in the presence and strength of automatic stabilizers in each
country, and the dierences in each country’s scal health before the crisis. Romer (2012) shows
a negative correlation between discretionary stimulus in 2009 and the gross debt-to-GDP ratio in
2007. While countries with high pre-crisis debt loads, such as Italy and Greece, undertook very
timid scal expansions in 2009, countries with low debt loads, such as China, South Korea and
Australia, were much more aggressive with their crisis response. In fact, Romer (2011) proposes
a provocative thought process counterfactual scenario. He speculates that if the United States or
Europe had begun the crisis with low debt burdens, no entitlement problems, and with condence
that temporary stimulus would not become permanent, then policymakers would have enacted
much more stimulus than they, in fact, did. Under these circumstances, he calculated that the
U.S. stimulus would have been $1.5 trillion, instead of the $0.8 trillion enacted.
How eective is public spending in stimulating demand? Perhaps the most relevant historical
anecdote evidencing the importance of scal stimulus (and particularly government spending)
is also recalled by Romer (2011). He notes that in the United States, the greatest increases in
government purchases in World War I, World War II and the Korean War were associated with
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booms in economic activity despite large tax increases and interventions at the microeconomic
level to restrict private demand.
e objective of this paper is threefold. First, it systematically documents the behavior of out-
put following nancial crises (banking or currency) accounting for pre-crisis debt-to-tax ratios.
at is, the paper formally analyzes the impact on output dynamics of an additional unit of debt-
to-tax revenue, conditional on the occurrence of nancial shocks. Second, I ask if banking crises
are systematically dierent from other nancial catastrophes (currency crises), and, most im-
portantly, if pre-crises scal buers are important whenever banking crises materialize. Finally,
the paper investigates whether, as the result of pre-shock debt-to-tax ratios, output dynamics
following a crisis are systematically dierent for emerging and developing economies than for
advanced countries. Here, I follow the estimation methodology proposed in Cerra and Saxena
(2008) (from now on referred to as CS), who estimate a univariate autoregressive model in growth
rates, and construct impulse response functions to display the relationship between growth and
nancial and political shocks. As an extension to their paper, the aim here is to account for the
pre-crisis scal burden, and assess output’s response to nancial shocks.
In assessing the output impact of the debt-to-tax-revenue ratio, conditional on the material-
ization of a nancial crisis, one must solve the potential endogeneity of the crisis measurement.
It is possible that crises and growth are jointly determined, arising in a simultaneity problem. I
discuss three possible, though far from denite, ways to address the issue, and I consider their
likely implications, both econometrically and in light of the results. I also impose a sensible ex-
clusion restriction on the debt-to-tax-revenue ratio variable, so that it is always exogenous with
respect to growth.
Fiscal burden is dened as in Aizenman and Jinjarak (2011)2. It is dened as the ratio between
government gross debt and tax revenue over the business cycle, and it can be interpreted as the
average tax years needed to repay the gross public debt. us, countries with higher measures
of scal burden are less scally healthy, or less able to credibly fund stimuli and to maintain a
sustainable debt path. In this context, this paper studies the impact on output dynamics of an
additional unit of pre-crisis scal burden, conditional on the occurrence of nancial shocks. It
2Fiscal burden is the multiplicative inverse of scal space as used in Aizenman and Jinjarak (2011). I use scal
burden for ease of interpretation.
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also explores if this eect is heterogeneous for banking crises and for emerging and developing
economies. e main hypothesis is that an additional unit of scal burden before the shock will be
associated with output losses, as countries with large scal burdens face diculty in sustainably
funding scal expenditures or transfers during and following crises.
Adopting the denition of scal burden as used by Aizenman and Jinjarak (2011), and I build
on their work. I contribute to the literature in several ways: First, I extend the scal burden
measure to include more countries, years and crises episodes. My extended sample comprises 155
countries, and covers the period between 1975 and 2011 (not only the Great Recession). Second,
in contrast to Aizenman and Jinjarak, I am not interested in the association between the size of
the stimulus and scal burden. ey claim that the debt-to-GDP ratio normalized by the average
tax base — scal burden — is negatively and signicantly associated with the size of the scal
stimulus during 2009 to 2011. I build on their result to investigate the link between the pre-crisis
scal burden and the output dynamics conditional on the occurrence of banking crises3. Finally,
I ask if this channel is particularly important for banking crises.
But, why is the scal burden particularly relevant before and during a banking crisis? First,
compared to other nancial shocks (currency crises, in particular), banking crises are associ-
ated with long-term output losses of greater magnitude for a large sample of both advanced and
emerging economies (see for example Cerra and Saxena (2008)). Second, banking crises’ negative
and persistent impacts on output underscore the relevance of beer understanding the potential
role scal buers play in ameliorating (or perpetuating) such losses.
In the event of a banking crisis, countries implement crisis management and mitigation poli-
cies. Some countercyclical policies consist of the Central Bank cuing interest rates or providing
quantitative easing; others can come in the form of tax cuts or increased government spending.
antitative easing policies provide an example of the importance of scal space in the wake of
banking crises. When a country’s banking system is in distress, as was the case in the United
States during the sub-prime mortgage crisis, the Central Bank injects liquidity to the private
banking sector by buying government bonds and other securities. e purpose is to encourage
banks to buy new assets, increase their lending, and boost investment. Also, if the Central Bank
3To the best of my knowledge, this is the rst paper that analyzes this particular hypothesis by using this measure
of scal burden for this period and for a large sample of both emerging and advanced countries
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is credible in ghting deation, the policy can promote economic activity by raising condence.
e extent to which a country is able to nance countercyclical scal (or quasi-scal) policies
depends on the buers it built before the crisis. Ample pre-crisis scal space allows for credible
mobilization of resources to fund stimulus without compromising the country’s debt sustainabil-
ity or its social contract. e government will incur a transitory increase of its primary decit
(as the result of increased spending or lower tax rates), without the debt service following an
explosive path (because, prior to the crisis, the scal policy was credible, and the debt path was
sustainable).
e hypotheses of the paper rely on the nding by Aizenman and Jinjarak that countries with
larger pre-crisis scal burdens implement lower scal stimulus during a crisis. I ask if countries
with larger scal burdens took longer to recover, or if they were hit harder during the crisis. If this
is the case, the tacit channel through which scal burden aects output would be precisely the
size of the scal stimulus implemented during the crisis. Investigating the channel is, nonetheless,
outside of the scope of this study.
I nd that an additional unit of scal burden prior to a banking crisis is associated with larger
output losses than for a currency crisis. Furthermore, emerging and developing economies ex-
perience deeper losses associated not only with nancial disruptions, but also with marginal
increases in scal burdens. e ndings are robust throughout the dierent specications and
assumptions made to deal with the endogeneity of crises.
e rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review. Section
3 describes the data used. Section 4 describes the methodology and specications employed in
testing the dierent hypotheses. Section 5, rst replicates CS’s main results, using alternative
crises dates, and then analyzes the impact of scal burdens on post-crises growth dynamics.
Section 6 deals with the possible endogeneity of crises and scal burdens, and provides estimates
under dierent scenarios to account for such endogeneity. Section 7 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
My work is related to the literature that links nancial crises to economic downturns, that ex-
plores the need for scal tools for short-run stabilization. Aer a severe nancial crisis, credit
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spreads will widen, making conventional monetary policy ineectual. When an economy’s mon-
etary policy is no longer eective — either because it is constrained by a zero lower bounds, or
because of lack of credibility in the monetary authority — discretionary scal stimuli oer feasi-
ble policy alternatives. In fact, according to the U.S. Council of Economic Advisors, almost every
country implemented some type of discretionary scal stimuli as a policy response to the Great
Recession.
Various work has found evidence of the eectiveness of discretionary scal policy in stimulat-
ing demand following a nancial shock. Using pre-recession Medicaid spending as instrument
for scal stimulus, Chodorow-Reich et al. (2012) nd evidence that theAmerican Recovery and
Reinvestment Act had a positive and signicant impact on job creation at the state level. In a
cross-country study, Baldacci et al. (2009) test the eect of dierent scal policies on the duration
of banking crises and on post-crises growth. Using ordered logit regression, they nd that scal
expansions are a relevant factor in reducing crises duration. Examining the growth rate ve years
aer the end of a crisis, they also nd that the composition of the scal response maers. Using
OLS regressions, they nd that surges in public investment or reductions in income taxes, signif-
icantly increase post-crisis growth (government consumption is not statistically signicant).
Fiscal space, however, maers in the eectiveness of scal stimuli. Aizenman and Jinjarak
(2011) account for the variation in the size of the scal stimulus in 123 countries during 2009 to
2011. Using Tobit estimations, they claim that the debt-to-GDP ratio normalized by the average
tax-base — scal burden — is negatively and signicantly associated with the size of the scal
stimulus during the same period. Baldacci et al. (2009) also analyze the impact of the interaction
between scal space and scal stimulus on crises duration and post-crises growth. ey dene an
economy as highly indebted (or with insucient scal space) by using a binary variable that takes
the value of one if the pre-crisis public-sector debt is above the sample average. ey nd that for
highly indebted economies, the positive impact of scal stimulus is weaker; they also conclude
that countries with more sustainable public nances have more scope for countercyclical scal
policies. eir work is related to mine because they take into account the impact of scal space
(though they dene it dierently). However, they do not take into account a possible reverse-
causality problem between scal space and post-crisis growth. Kannan et al. (2014a) nd that the
degree of public indebtedness reduces the eectiveness by which scal policy prompts growth
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one year into the recovery phase. In fact, they nd a negative relationship between the marginal
eect of the scal policy on the strength of the recovery, and the level of debt.
My work is also related to the literature of scal multipliers, and, in particular, to the literature
that nds that the size of the scal multipliers is larger during recessions than during expansions.
Intuitively, government spending is less likely to crowd out private investment and consumption
during a contractionary phase. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) implement a STVAR (smooth
transition VAR) model for the United States to estimate government spending multipliers that can
be state dependent — that is, they can vary across the cycle. ey nd that spending multipliers
are indeed dierent during recessions and expansions; they conclude that scal policy is consid-
erably more eective during recessions than during expansions. In a similar line of work, Batini
et al. (2012), using regime-switching VARs, estimate the size of the scal multipliers for the United
States, Europe, and Japan. ey nd that not only are expenditure multipliers signicantly larger
during downturns than during upturns, but also that expenditure multipliers are larger than tax
multipliers. is last point is related to my work because I argue that, given sucient pre-crisis
scal space, the policy variable in the short run is government spending (consumption or invest-
ment), and not necessarily tax cuts. A natural question that has surfaced in the literature involves
the issue of whether to use debt to alleviate a debt-induced crisis. Mishkin (2010) describes the
process by which banking crises lead to sharp economic downturns, and emphasizes the role of
deleveraging which inevitably causes spending to decline. Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) ar-
gue that “not all debt is created equal,” and that decit-nanced government spending can, in the
short run, avoid unemployment and deation while the private sector repairs its balance sheets.
In this context, pre-crisis scal space is useful to allow public spending to compensate for the
lack of private spending.
In this same line, Ostry et al. (2015) argue that debt is not necessarily bad for growth when
scal space is ample, but that high debt leaves lile or no margin for unexpected disasters. On the
one hand, the net present benet of lowering debt is high whenever there are signicant risks of
catastrophic events (nancial crises). In such a case, the government might need the additional
maneuverability to ramp up debt — especially when increasing taxes on short notice is politically
and economically dicult. If debt is already high when a shock occurs, sovereign risk premiums
could become prohibitively high, potentially resulting in a sovereign debt crisis. In this regard,
58
pre-crisis debt should be reduced today, to avoid a sovereign crisis tomorrow. On the other hand,
when scal space is ample, potentially more costs than benets are associated with lowering debt
aer a nancial crisis.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Variable Denition and construction
I use an annual panel dataset from 1970 to 2012 for 155 countries. Countries considered are
those for which Laeven and Valencia (2012) report in their nancial crisis dataset, and those for
which the measure of scal burden was available (refer to annex for full list of countries). To deal
with outliers, I trimmed 1 percent from the two tails of the distribution of both scal burden and
growth.
Banking Crises
e starting year of a banking crisis is dened using both quantitative data and a subjective
assessment of the situation, and is registered as a banking crisis episode only if it is systemic in
nature. Laeven and Valencia (2012) dene a banking crisis as systemic if both of the following
two situations are met: 1) “there are signicant signs of nancial distress in the banking system
(as indicated by signicant bank runs, losses in the banking system, and/or bank liquidations);”
and 2) signicant policy intervention measures are in place to serve as responses to the losses in
the banking system.
A sucient condition for a crisis episode to be classied as systemic is either if (i) losses in
the banking system are huge, resulting in a share of non-performing loans above 20 percent, or
closures of banks whose assets represent at least 20 percent of the total banking system assets;
or (ii) scal restructuring costs of the banking sector are higher than 5 percent of GDP (Laeven
and Valencia, 2012).
Before the 2000s, the maximum number of banking crises that had occurred in any year had
taken place in 1995 (12 banking crises). In 2008, however, the total number of crisis episodes grew
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nearly twofold of that gure, reaching a total of 22 crises (gure 3.1).
Figure 3.1: Banking Crises Episodes
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Total Number of Banking Crisis Per Year
3.3.2 Currency Crises
Currency crises dates are taken from Laeven and Valencia (2012), who dene a currency crisis as
nominal depreciation of the currency vis-a`-vis the U.S. dollar of at least 30 percent that is also at
least 10 percentage points higher than the rate of depreciation in the year before. Currency crises
are much more frequent than banking crises (gure 3.2). e year in which the most currency
crises occurred was 1994.
Debt, Tax Revenue and GDP Growth
e general government gross public debt-to-GDP data were constructed by merging the series
provided in the World Economic Outlook (WEO) dataset (September, 2012), produced by the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF), and the dataset found in Mauro et al. (2013), to maximize the
data coverage of this series (that is, to include more countries and years).
Tax-revenue-to-GDP ratios were obtained from the IMF’s Revenue Data for IMF Member Coun-
tries dataset (2012). I used total tax revenue (excluding social contributions) as a percentage of
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Figure 3.2: Currency Crises Episodes
GDP. e data are comparable to the WEO’s General Government data. In the scal space mea-
sure, I smooth for business cycle uctuations by averaging tax revenue to GDP over the previous
ve years.
Real GDP growth is obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI)
dataset.
Fiscal Burden
Fiscal burden is dened as the ratio of public debt to GDP to the average tax revenue collected over
the business cycle (over the previous ve years) (equation 3.1) . It is interpreted as the average
number of tax years it would take to repay the outstanding public debt. is measurement is the
inverse of the scal space dened by Aizenman and Jinjarak (2011).
f bi,t =
Public Debt to GDPi,t
1
5
∑4
τ=0 Tax Revenue-to-GDPi,t−τ
(3.1)
Intuitively, higher levels of public debt-to-GDP ratios relative to average tax revenue-to-GDP
ratios, indicate more tax-years to repay the outstanding debt, larger scal burdens, or lesser scal
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space.
e tax revenue-to-GDP ratio, averaged over the business cycle provides relevant, non-cyclical
information on the availability of tax resources to fund scal expenditures and transfers. Notice
that in order to disentangle the eect of scal burden and an actual scal stimulus adjustment
during the crisis, I use the pre-crisis scal burden measure (use the f bi,t−1whenever a crisis oc-
curred at time t ).
is measure of scal burden implicitly assumes that the short-run policy variable is debt. is
is for two reasons. First, tax revenue is taken as the average over the previous ve years. Second,
modifying legislature to change scal revenue in the short-run is politically and economically
dicult. It is reasonable to assume that the tax base depends on structural factors that are hard
to modify in the short term, while government spending can be relatively less costly to modify
in the short run. is is indeed the case for my sample. Tax-revenue ratio remains stable aer a
shock, while debt and scal burdens increase. e average, median, and percentiles 25th and 75th
of tax-revenue-to-GDP ratio remains stable aer a crisis; while debt-to-GDP and scal burdens
increase (gure 3.4).
e literature has frequently identied scal burdens, either by using ratios of public debt to
GDP, or scal decit to GDP. Nevertheless, these measures present problems. First, they do not
express the relationship between the government’s ability to fund scal stimuli and nancial
sustainability. Second, they are not necessarily comparable across countries or time, as the same
level of public debt to GDP might be consistent with dierent levels of scal space (depending
on the tax revenues).
3.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 displays the main descriptive statistics. GDP growth ranges between -13.7 and 19.9
percent, and the average number of years to repay the public debt is between zero and 31.8.
Emerging-market economies have both the highest and lowest growth rates in the sample, as
well as the worst scal space. ere are 2, 763 observations available for running the regressions
involving the scal space metric, and 5, 417 for running the basic exercise (without controlling
for scal space).
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Figure 3.3 presents the evolution of the scal burden measure by quartiles for the whole sample
of emerging and advanced economies. e indicator is much more stable for advanced economies
than for emerging and developing economies, and in terms of scal burden, advanced economies
are a more homogeneous group (for emerging and developing economies, there is a less pro-
nounced dierence between the scal burden of countries in the 25th percentile and those in the
75th percentile. Advanced economies’ scal burden signicantly deteriorates aer 2007, with no
signs of recovery.
Figure 3.4 displays the average evolution of relevant variables, given a banking crisis that
occurred in year t . e gures are constructed by restricting the sample to observations that
coincide with the occurrence of a banking crisis, and by graphing the mean and quartiles of the
variables three periods before and aer the average crisis. e lines display the evolution of the
mean and quartiles of all observations (all countries and all years) whenever a crisis happened in
year t .
Prior to the typical crisis, median GDP growth is relatively constant. At the time of the crisis,
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Figure 3.3: Evolution of Fiscal Burden: Whole Sample, Advanced and Emerging Economies
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Fiscal Burden
however, it declines, and becomes negative. Two periods aer the shock, median GDP growth
recovers to its pre-crisis levels (see top le panel in gure 3.4).
e scal burden deteriorates following a banking crisis, mostly reecting a sustained increase
in the public debt-to-GDP ratio. e hike is not monotonic for countries whose scal burden is
at the 75th percentile of scal burden, as, beyond a certain point, countries with excessive debt
might not be able to access nancial markets (top right panel in gure 3.4).
e ratio of tax revenue to GDP is relatively stable aer a banking crisis, while the ratio of
public debt to GDP exhibits a sustained increase aer the onset of nancial turmoil. As previously
mentioned, for the scal burden measure to be valid, the short-term policy variable should be
debt. Interestingly, following a banking crisis, economies tend to implement temporary scal
impulses, by shrinking their primary scal surplus (or expanding their decits) (see gure 3.4
boom right panel).
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Figure 3.4: Average and artile Evolution Before and Aer a Crisis in t
3.4 Methodology
e objective is to analyze the impact of banking crises (vis-a`-vis currency crises) on output and
its posterior dynamics, accounting for the country’s relative scal burden. e methodology
heavily relies on that used by Cerra and Saxena (2008) (henceforth, CS) who estimate a dynamic
panel model and construct impulse response functions to nancial and political shocks. As an
extension to their paper, the aim here is to account for the pre-crisis scal burden, and to assess
output’s response to a nancial shock.
Panel unit root tests were conducted and suggest non-stationarity in output. us, I estimate
a univariate autoregressive model in growth rates. e benchmark specication is described in
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equation (3.2), and is also the benchmark specication in CS. e real GDP growth rate of country
i at time t is denoted by yi,t ; crisisi,t is a dummy variable indicating the occurrence of a nancial
crisis for country i at time t , and ϵit is an idiosyncratic shock. e coecient βj captures the
autoregressive component of GDP growth, and δs is the impact of a contemporaneous nancial
crisis, and its lagged eects.
yi,t = αi +
4∑
j=1
βjyi,t−j +
4∑
s=0
δscrisisi,t−s + ϵit (3.2)
Equation (3.3), augments specication (3.2) by introducing the interaction term between a crisis
in year t and the pre-crisis measurement of scal burden(FBi,t−1). It captures the dierential eect
of a crisis allowing for scal burden heterogeneity.
yi,t = αi +
4∑
j=1
βjyi,t−j +
4∑
s=0
δscrisisi,t−s +
4∑
s=0
γscrisisi,t−sFBi,t−s−1 + ϵit
= αi +
4∑
j=1
βjyi,t−j +
4∑
s=0
crisisi,t−s (δs + γsFBi,t−s−1) + ϵit
(3.3)
e purpose here is twofold. e rst purpose is to explore the robustness of CS’s results
using a dierent sample (1970-2011 versus 1960-2001), and using other measures of nancial
shocks (use the banking and currency crises dates as compiled by Laeven and Valencia (2012)).
e second purpose is to compare the relative loss in output growth in CS’s main specication
(equation (3.2)) to that which occurs aer accounting for the pre-crisis scal burden. us, to
establish clear comparisons, I follow Cerra and Saxena (2008)’s estimation strategy. Estimations
are conducted using a dynamic panel model with country xed eects; this accounts for serial
correlation in growth rates. An AR(4) model is estimated as there are no signicant coecients
beyond the fourth lag.
A possible downside from this estimation is that the lagged dependent variable yi,t−j is corre-
lated with the country xed eect αi . However, as noted by CS (who cite Nickell (1981)), the size
of the bias is 1/T , which is small for the time dimension used here.
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3.5 Results
3.5.1 Replication
e rst set of exercises replicates the main specication in Cerra and Saxena (2008), but using
Laeven and Valencia (will be referred to as LV from now on) nancial shock dates, as they pro-
vide data for the period between 1970-2011, allowing the Great Recession to be included in the
estimations4.
e impact on output following a currency crisis is negative, though a partial mean-reverting
process starts one period aer the shock. For the full sample, the long-term losses associated with
a currency crisis are on average 2.3 percent. While emerging markets partially recover, output
losses are permanent for advanced economies (see gure 3.5).
e impact of a banking crisis on output is much more severe, negative, and persistent (gure
3.6). For the full sample, the impact is three times as large as the impact of a currency crisis
(resulting in an average loss of 6.9 percent for a banking crisis , as compared to the 2.3 percent
average loss for a currency crisis). Advanced economies are the hardest hit following a banking
crisis. is might be explained by the fact that they have deeper nancial markets and more
integrated banking systems.
ese results indicate that banking crises are dierent than other types of nancial shocks.
Larger and more persistent output losses are associated with banking crises than with currency
crises.
All of these results are consistent with CS’s original impulse response functions, except that
the losses associated with a currency crisis are persistent for their sample and their crises dates.
3.5.2 Impact of Additional Unit of Fiscal Burden
Constructing the output response based on equation (3.3) captures both the impact of the shock,
and the shock interacted with the scal burden measure (crisisi,t (δs + γsFBi,t−s−1) from equation
(3.3)). e challenge is to isolate the eect of an additional unit of scal burden conditional on
a nancial crisis. Two steps were taken to address this challenge. First, the impulse response
4CS’s period is between 1960-2001.
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Figure 3.5: Impulse Responses: Currency Crises (1970-2011)
IRF of Currency Crisis (1970-2011 and 1970-2001 for Cerra & Saxena dates)
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Figure 3.6: Impulse Responses: Banking Crises (1970-2011)
IRF of Banking Crisis (1970-2011 and 1970-2001 for Cerra & Saxena dates)
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functions of banking and currency crises, controlling for the pre-shock level of scal burden,
were computed. I estimate the output responses for three groups of pre-crisis scal burden levels:
high, medium and low, which correspond to the 80th , median and the 20th pre-crisis scal burden
percentiles, respectively (See appendix  for impulse response functions of joint eect).
Second, I take as the counterfactuals the output responses to banking and currency crises
constructed in the previous section. us, the isolated eect of an additional unit of scal burden,
conditional on a nancial shock, is the output response dierence between the joint dynamic
impact on output and the impact of a crisis.
Conditional on a banking crisis, an additional tax year to repay the public debt prior to the
onset of the shock is associated with large and persistent output loss. For the full sample, the
magnitude of the impact, however, depends on the scal burden distribution, and the relationship
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between output losses. e pre-crisis scal burden does not seem to be linear. e loss in output
is the least for countries in the median (3.8 percent loss), while it is the most for those in the 20th
percentile (5.8 percent loss) (gure 3.7).
e depth of the losses associated with an additional tax year to repay public debt varies by
developing stage. While output loss for advanced economies is at most 1.3 percent, the average
loss for emerging and developing economies is at least 6.3 percent and at most 8.4 percent. In-
terestingly, for emerging and developing economies, the magnitude of the loss depends on the
distribution of scal burden in the expected direction. e least-aected countries are those with
the lowest pre-crisis scal burden, while the largest losses were experienced by those with the
largest pre-crisis scal burden (see gure 3.7).
Figure 3.7: Output Response: Additional Unit of Fiscal Burden Conditional on Banking Crises
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Figure 3.8: Output Response: Additional Unit of Fiscal Burden Conditional on Currency Crises
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e impact of an additional unit of scal burden conditional on a currency crisis is only half
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than that conditional on a banking crisis (gure 3.8). Just as for the case of banking crises, the
magnitude of the impact is dierent across development groups. For emerging and developing
economies, an additional unit of scal burden is associated with negative and persistent impacts
on output. is is not the case, however, for advanced economies. In fact, for those in the high
scal-burden group (80th pre-scal burden percentile), an additional unit of scal burden has
positive and persistent eect on output at the 10-year horizon (the same is true for those in the
median, to a lesser degree). A sensible explanation as to why this is the case is outside the scope
of this paper. Nevertheless, one could speculate that this phenomenon might be because a mas-
sive devaluation hurts some economic agents and sectors (national consumers of foreign goods,
importers, and the government, if it has liabilities in foreign exchange), but might benet others
(exporters and net lenders in foreign currency). e net impact depends on the composition of
the particular economy.
3.6 Exogeneity
3.6.1 Fiscal Burden
e objective here is to quantify the impact of pre-crisis scal burden on output dynamics. As-
suming that the one-year lag in scal burden is not simultaneously determined with output can
be problematic, however. One can think of scenarios in which an exogenous shock impacts both
f bt−1 and growth at year t . For instance, a dramatic increase in funding costs in year t − 1, will
erode scal burden, crowd out private (and public) investment, and have an impact in output
growth at year t .
To tackle this problem, I use the two-year lag in scal burden. I argue that the two-year lag in
scal burden is not simultaneously determined with output at the time of a nancial disruption.
I address the validity of this assumption as follows:
First, recall that the scal burden is the ratio of debt to GDP to the ve-year average of
tax revenue-to-GDP ratio. Fiscal burden uctuates whenever debt changes, as the average tax-
revenue is a stable variable (see gure 3.4).
Second, the government budget for year t − 2 is passed by Congress (or the equivalent admin-
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istrative power) in year t − 3 (and executed in year t − 2). If anything, a shock to output on year
t , has an impact on today’s budget planning, which is executed in year t + 1. A shock in year t
could also trigger an increase in the debt level that year, but it could not aect the stock of debt
or budget planning undertaken two years prior to that time.
Furthermore, not even massive devaluations could potentially aect both f bt−2 and yt . Very
few currency crises lasted longer than 2 years. us, an exchange rate shock can potentially
impact foreign currency-denominated debt, but that same innovation would be unlikely to aect
growth two years ahead. For the rest of the paper, I employ f bt−2 as the pre-crisis scal burden
measure, under the justied assumption that it is exogenous with respect to output. I focus on
solving a more pressing endogeneity problem caused by the crises measurement itself.
3.6.2 Addressing the Endogeneity Problem: Crises
e underlying assumption of equations (3.2) and (3.3) in the previous section, is that crises are
contemporaneously exogenous. However, other relationships are also plausible. It can be that
output growth is contemporaneously exogenous with respect to a crisis, and that a crisis has an
eect on output only through its lags. Or It can be that growth and crises are jointly determined
(through an equilibrium mechanism), causing a simultaneity problem.
Following the strategy proposed in Cerra and Saxena (2008), I delve into the consequences of
dierent identication assumptions, and discuss how to address the endogeneity issue.
Consider the relationship between output growth, crisis and pre-crisis scal burden as a pos-
sibly non-linear system of equations:
yi,t = αi +
4∑
j=1
βjyi,t−j +
4∑
s=0
δscrisisi,t−s +
4∑
s=0
γscrisisi,t−sFBi,t−s−1 + ϵit (3.4)
Pr (crisisi,t = 1) = F *.,µ +
4∑
j=0
ψjyi,t−j +
4∑
s=1
ϕscrisisi,t−s +
4∑
s=1
ρscrisisi,t−sFBi,t−s−1 + νit+/- (3.5)
FBi,t = κ +
4∑
j=0
Ajyi,t−j−1 +
4∑
s=0
Bscrisisi,t−s +
4∑
τ=1
λτ FBi,t−s + ξit (3.6)
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Notice from equation (3.6) that I am excluding the possibility that a contemporaneous inno-
vation in either growth or a crisis have an impact on scal burden, as assumed by the scal
burden-exclusion restriction discussed previously. Also note that an innovation to scal burden
today has no impact on the probability of a crisis today (see equation (3.5)).
All the results in section 3.5 assume that all the coecients in equations (3.5) and (3.6) are
zero. is assumes: i) that a crisis is strictly exogenous with respect to both growth and scal
burden, and it is serially uncorrelated; and ii) that the scal burden measure is strictly exogenous
with respect to growth and the crisis, and it is also serially uncorrelated. In this section I relax
assumption i) while keeping assumption ii). I allow for a bivariate system of equations that jointly
determines growth and the probability of crisis, while still taking the pre-crisis scal burden as
exogenous. us, I allow for the coecients in equation (3.5) to be dierent from zero, but those
in equation (3.6) are kept as zero.
Contemporaneously Exogenous Output Growth
One way to deal with the contemporaneous endogeneity of crises, is to impose a zero-restriction
a`-la-VAR model. is entails assuming that crisis only has a lagged eect on output growth, or
imposing a zero-contemporaneous relationship between the variables (δ0 = γ0 = 0 in equation
(3.4)). is assumption implies that the E(νit |yit ) = 0, and thus that growth is contemporaneously
exogenous with respect to a crisis. e modied (zero-restriction) specication is presented in
equation (3.7). Note that scal burden is the two-year lag, on par with the exclusion restriction.
yi,t = αi +
4∑
j=1
βjyi,t−j +
4∑
s=1
δscrisisi,t−s +
4∑
s=1
γscrisisi,t−sFBi,t−s−1 + ϵit (3.7)
e same steps to isolate the impact of an additional unit of pre-crisis scal burden, conditional
on a nancial disruption, were taken as in section 3.5.2. First, the impulse response functions of
banking and currency crises, controlling for the pre-shock level of scal burden were computed.
(See appendix  for impulse response functions of joint eect). Second, the isolated eect of an
additional unit of scal burden, conditional on a nancial shock, is the output response dierence
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between the joint dynamic impact on output and the impact of a crisis, all while imposing a zero
restriction on the contemporaneous relationship between growth and crises.
For the full sample and for the case of banking crises, the impact of an additional unit of scal
burden is ameliorated when the contemporaneous decline in output is aributed to the output
innovation (gure 3.9). Even under this assumption, previous results are still robust. GDP losses
range between 2.5 percent and 5.3 percent at a 10-year horizon, with no signs of rebound. e
group of countries with the lowest associated long term loss is, nevertheless, the one with high
levels of scal burden.
ere is a clear dierence between advanced and emerging market countries. An additional tax
year to repay the public debt the same year a crisis occurs (at t − 1) is associated with persistent
output losses at year t for emerging economies, but not for advanced economies. In fact, advanced
economies experience a small initial dip, followed by a solid rebound, and then output gains
of between 0.4 percent and 1.1 percent of the pre-crisis output. A possible explanation is that
the scal burden and the crisis both enter the specication at time t − 1. us, once a crisis
is contemporaneously happening, a further deterioration in the scal burden could indicate the
implementation of countercyclical policies. In this regard, given that a crisis occurred at time
t − 1, a deterioration of the scal buer (additional unit of scal burden) eectively aids in the
recovery of advanced economies, though this same deterioration in the scal buer is still not
enough for emerging and developing economies. For this last group of countries, not only is the
eect of the banking crisis larger, but also there might be other factors at play, e.g., a credibility
channel, which might help explain the lack of recovery.
For a currency crisis, an additional unit of scal burden during a crisis year is associated with
output gain of about 1.5 percent above levels prior to the shock (gure 3.10). Emerging economies,
on the other hand, are not able to recover with an additional unit of scal burden during the
crisis years, though the magnitude of the losses are smaller than when compared to the case
when δ0 , 0 and γ0 , 0. Advanced economies that belong to the group of countries whose scal
burdens are in the 20th percentile recover aer the crisis, and they reach output gains of about
4 percent of the pre-crisis output, while those whose scal burdens are in the 80th percentile
experience output losses of about 4 percent.
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Figure 3.9: Output Response: Lagged Response of Fiscal Burden Conditional on Banking Crisis
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Figure 3.10: Output Response: Lagged Response of Fiscal Burden Conditional on Currency
Crisis
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Forecast Errors
Another feasible way to deal with the simultaneity problem is to construct forecast errors under
two extreme assumptions (as in Cerra and Saxena (2008)). Either all contemporaneous correlation
between output and crisis can be explained by: i) crisis innovations, or ii) output innovations. e
forecast errors are the result of comparing the observed output following a crisis, with the output
predicted by a univariate AR model that only controls for business cycle dynamics (similar to the
one described in equation (3.8)):
yi,t = αi +
4∑
j=1
βjyi,t−j + ϵit (3.8)
By constructing forecast errors as the dierence between observed growth following a crisis
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and the growth predicted by the AR(4) model, and by assuming that equations (3.4) and (3.5)
capture the real data-generating process, one captures a measure of the impact of the crisis along
with how this impact varies for dierent levels of pre-crisis scal burdens (i.e., the eect captured
is that which results from ∑ crisisi,t−s (δs + γsFBi,t−s−1)).
Forecast errors are the dierence between current (and subsequent) observed output growth
and the predicted growth rate derived by estimating equation (3.8). e forecast errors for the
rst, second, third, and fourth periods ahead are computed for each crisis date t and country
i . e construction of the forecast errors, however, depends on the assumption adopted about
the contemporaneous correlation between output and crisis. Under the scenario in which all the
contemporaneous correlation between output and crisis can aributed to one of the following
innovations, forecast errors are constructed as follows:
1. Crisis innovations: is scenario assumes that the occurrence of a crisis is contemporane-
ously exogenous with respect to output growth, as the only source of correlation between
a crisis and output is that derived between νit and yit , implying the exogeneity of a crisis.
Low growth at time t can thus be aributed to a crisis innovation at time t . To construct
the k-period (k=1, . . . , 4) ahead forecast errors, one should use growth data only through
time t −1. Recall that time t is the date of the crisis. us, if ae crisis innovation can explain
output growth in the same period, and we need to construct a period-ahead forecast error,
we should only consider data until one period before the crisis. e forecast errors under
polar assumption (1) are displayed in expression (3.9).
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f err+1 = yit − y fit = yit − (αˆi +
4∑
j=1
βˆjyi,t−j )
f err+2 = yi,t+1 − y fi,t+1
= yi,t+1 −
(
αˆi + βˆ1y
f
i,t + βˆ2yi,t−1 + βˆ3yi,t−2 + βˆ4yi,t−3
)
f err+3 = yi,t+2 − y fi,t+2
= yi,t+2 −
(
αˆi + βˆ1y
f
i,t+1 + βˆ2y
f
i,t + βˆ3yi,t−1 + βˆ4yi,t−2
)
f err+4 = yi,t+3 − y fi,t+3
= yi,t+3 −
(
αˆi + βˆ1y
f
i,t+2 + βˆ2y
f
i,t+1 + βˆ3y
f
i,t + βˆ4yi,t−1
)
(3.9)
2. Output growth innovations: In this scenario, the only source of correlation between output
and crisis comes from an output growth innovation. Since a shock to crisis today does not
impact growth today, this is equivalent to assuming that δ0 = γ0 = 0 in equation (3.4).
Forecast errors based on the AR(4) model can be constructed using growth information
until time t .
˜f err+1 = yi,t+1 − y fi,t+1 = yi,t+1 − (αˆi +
4∑
j=1
βˆjyi,t−j+1)
˜f err+2 = yi,t+2 − y fi,t+2
= yi,t+2 −
(
αˆi + βˆ1y
f
i,t+1 + βˆ2yi,t + βˆ3yi,t−1 + βˆ4yi,t−2
)
˜f err+3 = yi,t+3 − y fi,t+3
= yi,t+3 −
(
αˆi + βˆ1y
f
i,t+2 + βˆ2y
f
i,t+1 + βˆ3yi,t + βˆ4yi,t−1
)
˜f err+4 = yi,t+4 − y fi,t+4
= yi,t+4 −
(
αˆi + βˆ1y
f
i,t+3 + βˆ2y
f
i,t+2 + βˆ3y
f
i,t+1 + βˆ4yi,t
)
(3.10)
I compute each set of forecast errors for each crisis episode. en I compute the average fore-
cast error across the sample for the rst, second, third, and fourth periods ahead.
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As a rst exercise, gure (3.11) depicts the forecast errors, which measure the impact of a crisis
along with the eect of an additional unit of scal burden, conditional the occurrence of a nan-
cial shock. Regardless of the polar assumption adopted to explain all the source of correlation
between output and crises innovations, persistent output losses are present. Under assumption
2, since we have assumed that crises have only lagged eects on growth, i.e., δ0 = γ0 = 0, the
magnitude of the loss is smaller. Notice that the particular assumption chosen to explain the
contemporaneous correlation between output and crises has a larger impact on the magnitude
of the output losses for currency crises than for banking crises.
Figure 3.11: Forecast Error: Joint Eect of Crises and Fiscal Burden Conditional on Crises
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e next exercise is an aempt to dissect the eect of an additional unit of scal burden, con-
ditional on the occurrence of a nancial crisis one year ahead. To do so, I run the following set
of regressions for each forecast horizon k and crisis year t :
f err+k = δk + γkFBi,t−1 + ϵit
˜f err+k = δ˜k + γ˜kFBi,t−1 + ˜ϵi,t
(3.11)
Next, with the estimated coecients, γˆk and ˆ˜γk , I obtain the portion of the forecast error that
is due to the pre-crisis scal burden. Results show that for both nancial crises, an additional
unit of scal burden is associated with persistent output losses, though the magnitude is larger
for banking than for currency crises (gure (3.12)). Also, the magnitude of the loss depends on
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the polar assumption made. For currency crises, the magnitude of the loss is lower if crises have
only lagged eects on growth, whereas the opposite is true for banking crises.
Figure 3.12: Forecast Error: Eect of Additional Unit of Pre-Crisis Fiscal Burden Conditional on
Crisis Happening
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3.7 Synthesis of Results
Table 3.2 presents a synthesis of all results at dierent percentiles of scal burden. e “plain
vanilla” specication refers to the specication in which neither scal burden nor crisis potential
simultaneity bias is considered. In that scenario, an additional unit of scal burden, conditional
on the occurrence of a banking crisis, reduces long-term output from a range of 3.9 percent to 5.9
percent. It is likely, however, that, due to the bias, these results underestimate the true eect of
the pre-crisis scal burden on output dynamics. e zero-exclusion restriction is the specication
in which no contemporaneous correlation between output growth and crisis is permied, and in
which scal burden only enters the regression with two lags. e magnitude of the estimated
long-term output loss range is smaller than in the “plain vanilla” model. In addition, it is likely
that the forecast error methodologies overestimate the magnitude of the output losses. is is
because the forecasted error captures everything that is not in the autoregressive growth model.
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Table 3.2: Synthesis of Results
Banking Crisis Currency Crisis
Plain vanilla [-5,9, -4.5, -3.9] % loss; permanent [-3.1, -2.8, -1.9]% loss; permanent
Zero exclusion restriction [-5.2, -4.2, -2.6]% loss; permanent [+1.2, +1.3, +1.5]% initial dip; recov.
and f bt−2
FE: crisis exogenous -4.9% loss; permanent -2.3% loss; permanent
FE: output exogenous -2.2% loss; permanent initial dip; recov. +1%
Zero exclusion restriction -4.2% loss; permanent initial dip; recov. +1.3%
and f bt−2
3.8 Concluding Remarks
Using panel data for 155 countries for the period between 1975 and 2011, I nd that the original
results of Cerra and Saxena (2008) are robust to dierent banking crises dates, though not to al-
ternative currency crises dates. Banking crises have a negative and persistent impacts on output,
with losses of 6.9 percent; by contrast, the negative impacts on output from currency crises are
partially reverted, with losses averaging 2.3 percent.
An additional unit of pre-crisis scal burden has a dierential impact on output dynamics
depending if a banking crisis or a currency crisis is involved. In the case of banking crises, an
additional unit of scal burden is associated with more pronounced and persistent output losses,
than is the case of currency crises. Emerging market countries also experience larger losses
associated with an additional unit of scal burden; these countries never recover to pre-crisis
output levels, as happens in some instances for advanced countries.
To address the possible endogeneity issue of crises, I computed the forecast errors that result
from comparing the actual level of output following a crisis with the level of output predicted by a
univariate AR model that controls for business-cycle dynamics. Under two extreme assumptions,
the results indicate that an additional unit of scal burden is associated with persistent output
losses, though the magnitude of the loss is larger for banking crises than for currency crises.
Finally, if one assumes that crises only have a lagged eect on output growth, then a marginal
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increase in scal burden can actually have a positive impact on growth for advanced economies,
while this is not the case for emerging and developing economies.
Eorts to address a possible endogeneity issue of crises are far from reaching denite conclu-
sions, though they might be suggestive of possible causal relationships. Further research could
be aimed at estimating how growth and scal burdens aect the probability of crises.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Varying α and θ : Heat Map and Contour Plots
Figure A.1: Equilibrium Exclusion Rate: Heat Map
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Figure A.2: Debt Variation with α and θ
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Figure A.3: AA Variation with α and θ
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(b) Contour Plot: AA
A.2 Haircuts: Case Studies
Table A.1: Haicuts: Case Studies
Year Haircut Comments
Greece 2011-18 0% No restructuring.
Belize 2012-2013 10% (initially 45%) “Risks of holdout and litigation”.
Grenada 2013-2015 50% Country’s airport assets under aachment threat.
Ecuador 2014 Seled out of court. Holdout led lawsuit.
Ukraine 2015-18 20% Legal threats and litigation. Block holdouts blocked CACs.
Congo 2017-18 -8.21% Long legal dispute. Court ordered payments to holdout.
Source: Schumacher et al. (2018).
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Country Coverage
Advanced markets (AMs): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom, United States.
Emerging markets (EMs): Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Azer-
baijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil,
Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Do-
minican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Gabon, Guatemala,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon,
Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Oman,
Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia,
Serbia, Seychelles, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Kis and Nevis, Suriname, Swazi-
land, Syria, ailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab
Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela.
B.2 Control Variables
e next tables show a brief literature survey that informed our selection of control variables, the
main control variables used in the regressions, and corresponding data sources. Determinants of
Bond Spreads and Default Probability in the Empirical Literature
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Table B.1: Determinants of Bond Spreads and Default Probability in the Empirical Literature
Table B.2: List of Control Variables and Sources
B.3 Asset Data — Government Balance Sheets
e two tables below describe the data sources and discuss the pros and cons of the asset cate-
gories used in the baseline estimations.
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Table B.3: Categories of Financial Assets: Pros and Cons
CATEGORY PROS CONS
Includes illiquid assets
Total Comprehensive measure Includes assets that are not readly available
Includes assets that may not be properly valued
Held in Debt Symmetry with gross debt Includes illiquid assets
Instruments measure Includes assets that are not readly available
Includes assets that may not be properly valued
Liquid Easily valued Too narrow for assessing medium and long term risks
Highly liquid Easily valued
Can be liquidated quickly Too narrow for assessing medium and long term risks
Table B.4: Data Sources and Coverage: Pros and Cons
CATEGORY Source PROS CONS
Follows international statistical standards.
Total OECD, Eurostat, GFS Consistent across country and time. Short time series for EMs.
Follows international statistical standards.
Held in Debt Instruments OECD, Eurostat, GFS Consistent across country and time. Short time series for EMs.
Follows international statistical standards.
Liquid OECD, Eurostat, GFS Consistent across country and time. Short time series for EMs.
Follows international statistical standards.
Highly liquid OECD, Eurostat, GFS Consistent across country and time.
Most liquid category Short time series for EMs.
Long time series for many countries. Non-standardized reporting.
Financial Assets WEO Compiled by country experts (desks). Signicant revisions.
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B.4 Asset Data — WEO
While the data obtained from OECD, Eurostat and GFS are consistent and comparable across
countries and time, they have short time coverage for most EMs. WEO data, on the other hand,
has less uniform reporting standards but longer time series for most countries. e instrument
coverage and government perimeter of the assets reported in WEO vary across countries. is
is somewhat illustrated in the table below, which presents the results of an informal survey of
reporting standards with IMF country desks of top asset holders. Typically, assets reported by
country desks are a subset of the assets reported in balance sheets, but for many AMs the former
is equal to the total reported in the laer. On the other hand, the desks of many EMs tend to
report either assets held in debt instruments or a smaller subset (e.g.,liquid, highly liquid).1 In
practice, IMF country desks report net debt, hence assets based on WEO data are obtained by
subtracting net debt from gross debt.
Table B.5: Survey on WEO Reporting Standards—Top Asset Holders
Furthermore, while most desks report assets at the general government level, over a third
reported other government perimeters. e survey also revealed a caveat with obtaining the
WEO indicator as a residual: to the extent that gross debt covers one government perimeter
1e WEO’s methodological guide suggests reporting assets held in debt instruments. See Dippelsman et al.
(2012) for a detailed discussion on issues of coverage.
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and net debt covers another, the underlying assets cannot be related to either. WEO data is also
subject to frequent revisions and seems to carry an optimism bias. For instance, while there have
been signicant downward revisions in the major drivers of debt and assets in recent vintages,
asset projections seem more optimistic than macro fundamentals.2
Figure B.1: WEO Projections, April Vintages, Averages Across AMs and EMs
2We use a common sample to compare vintages, so the shi in historical data purely reects data revision.
Because equity is typically recorded at historical cost, revisions are probably more related to other asset instruments,
while also reecting changes coverage and other measurement aspects.
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B.5 antile Regressions—Baseline Parameters
Figure B.2: Baseline antile Coecients (total assets)
Figure B.3: Baseline antile Coecients (Assets Held in Debt Instruments)
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Figure B.4: Baseline antile Coecients (Liquid Assets)
B.6 antile Regressions — Robustness
Figure B.5: Baseline antile Coecients (Highly Liquid Assets)
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Figure B.6: Marginal Eect of Debt and Assets on Spreads: Baseline Model and WEO Assets
Figure B.7: Marginal Eect of Assets on Spreads: Model Including Output Gap
Figure B.8: Marginal Eect of Assets on Spreads: Baseline Model and Sub-sample 1980–2007
Figure B.9: Marginal Eect of Assets on Spreads: HVR Specication and WEO Assets
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Figure B.10: Growth and Output Gap Dynamics Around Debt Distress Episodes
B.7 Panel OLS and Probit Regressions — Robustness
Table B.6: OLS Fixed Eect Regressions for WEO (Dependent Variable: Bond Spreads, in bps)
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Table B.7: Pooled Probit Baseline Regressions Including Country Output Gap
Controls Total Assets in debt Liquid Highly liquid
assets instruments assets assets
Gross debt/GDP, lagged 2.273*** 1.977** 2.379** 2.581***
Assets/GDP, lagged 1.632* 0.294 -4.134 -2.047
Assets/GDPxEM, lagged -3.369** -3.828 -14.18* -15.28
EM dummy 1.200* 1.312* 0.797 0.989
Real GDP growth, lagged -14.94** -14.30*** -15.15** -12.49*
CAB/GDP(3 year avg.), lagged -10.55** -11.16** -9.827* -11.84**
Reverses/GDP, lagged -14.94** -14.30*** -15.15** -12.49*
Ination rate, lagged 5.911** -2.182 1.383 1.541
Country credit ratings, lagged -6.093*** -3.344** -5.233*** -5.774***
Output gap 17.79*** 12.25*** 16.32*** 13.99***
VIX 4.267 3.296 5.601 5.386*
Constant -4.976*** -4.409*** -4.676*** -4.890***
Observations 707 709 704 703
Pseudo R-squared 0.58 0.51 0.58 0.58
Marginal eect of assets -0.03 -0.07 -0.32*** -0.31**
Marginal eect of debt and assets 0.01 -0.03 -0.28** -0.26
***, **, * denote signicant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, based on robust standard errors.
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Table B.8: Pooled Probit Regressions for EMs Only
Table B.9: Pooled Probit Regressions for the Broad Denition of Debt Distress
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Table B.10: Pooled Probit Regressions for WEO Assets
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Output Response of Crises and Fiscal Burden
Figure C.1: Impulse Responses: Banking Crises Accounting for Pre-Crisis Fiscal Burden
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Figure C.2: Impulse Responses: Currency Crises Accounting for Pre-Crisis Fiscal Burden
IRF of Currency Crisis (1970-2011 and 1970-2001 for Cerra & Saxena dates)
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C.2 Output Response of Crises and Fiscal Burden: Zero
Restriction
Figure C.3: Output Response: Lagged Response of Fiscal Burden Conditional on Banking Crisis
IRF of Banking Crisis (1970-2011 and 1970-2001 for Cerra & Saxena dates)
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Figure C.4: Output Response: Lagged Response of Fiscal Burden Conditional on Currency Crisis
IRF of Banking Crisis (1970-2011 and 1970-2001 for Cerra & Saxena dates)
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C.3 Regression Output: Zero Exclusion Restriction
C.3.1 Banking Crises
Table C.1: Regression Results: Banking Crisis
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES All Crisis Only: AMs Crisis Only: EMs
L.gdp growth wb 0.22*** 0.30*** 0.21***
(0.027) (0.029) (0.029)
L2.gdp growth wb 0.05** -0.14*** 0.07***
(0.021) (0.042) (0.022)
L3.gdp growth wb 0.05*** 0.15*** 0.04**
(0.019) (0.040) (0.020)
L4.gdp growth wb -0.04** -0.11*** -0.03*
(0.017) (0.034) (0.018)
L.bc LV -2.96*** -5.03*** -2.19***
(0.483) (0.641) (0.599)
L2.bc LV 0.45 -0.35 0.78
(0.385) (0.615) (0.471)
L3.bc LV 0.27 -0.86* 0.48
(0.390) (0.472) (0.495)
L4.bc LV -0.25 -1.62*** 0.25
(0.285) (0.393) (0.323)
Constant 2.74*** 2.61*** 2.83***
(0.141) (0.200) (0.159)
Observations 4,576 1,083 3,493
R-squared 0.08 0.21 0.07
Number of id 149 31 118
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table C.2: Regression Results: Banking Crisis and Fiscal Burden
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Crisis and FB Crisis and FB: AMss Crisis and FB: EMs
L.gdp growth wb 0.17*** 0.34*** 0.12**
(0.046) (0.051) (0.055)
L2.gdp growth wb -0.02 -0.10** -0.02
(0.032) (0.048) (0.034)
L3.gdp growth wb -0.02 0.14*** -0.05
(0.029) (0.040) (0.033)
L4.gdp growth wb -0.07*** -0.14** -0.06*
(0.027) (0.055) (0.032)
L.bc LV -7.26*** -6.40*** -7.37***
(0.880) (1.284) (1.425)
L2.bc LV -0.47 1.32 -0.48
(0.687) (1.270) (1.099)
L3.bc LV -0.55 0.96 -0.34
(0.399) (0.835) (0.723)
L4.bc LV -2.31*** -1.29* -1.54**
(0.492) (0.658) (0.769)
L.bc LV * L2FS -0.82*** 0.48 0.84***
(0.201) (0.439) (0.249)
L2.bc LV *L3FS - 0.22 -0.58 0.31
(0.207) (0.471) (0.249)
L3.bc LV * L4FS 0.20 -0.79 0.30**
(0.126) (0.483) (0.136)
L4.bc LV * L5FS 0.36*** -0.28 0.38***
(0.098) (0.267) (0.092)
Constant 3.47*** 2.21*** 4.23***
(0.198) (0.271) (0.273)
Observations 2,127 834 1,293
R-squared 0.12 0.30 0.08
Number of id 135 31 104
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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C.3.2 Currency Crises
Table C.3: Regression Results: Currency Crisis
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Crisis Only Crisis Only: AMs Crisis Only: EMs
L.gdp growth wb 0.22*** 0.35*** 0.21***
(0.027) (0.034) (0.029)
L2.gdp growth wb 0.05** -0.15*** 0.07***
(0.021) (0.038) (0.022)
L3.gdp growth wb 0.06*** 0.17*** 0.05**
(0.018) (0.037) (0.020)
L4.gdp growth wb -0.03* -0.11*** -0.03
(0.017) (0.035) (0.019)
L.cc LV -0.18 0.25 -0.21
(0.413) (0.902) (0.448)
L2.cc LV 0.78* -0.51 0.91**
(0.398) (0.570) (0.433)
L3.cc LV 0.53 -0.01 0.61
(0.343) (0.348) (0.378)
L4.cc LV 0.79** -0.02 0.87**
(0.314) (0.664) (0.337)
Constant 2.57*** 2.21*** 2.70***
(0.153) (0.196) (0.179)
Observations 4,610 1,083 3,527
R-squared 0.06 0.12 0.06
Number of id 150 31 119
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table C.4: Regression Results: Currency Crisis and Fiscal Burden
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Crisis and FB Crisis and FB: AMs Crisis and FB: EMs
L.gdp growth wb 0.21*** 0.41*** 0.15***
(0.046) (0.057) (0.055)
L2.gdp growth wb -0.03 -0.14*** -0.02
(0.034) (0.040) (0.036)
L3.gdp growth wb -0.00 0.17*** -0.05
(0.029) (0.038) (0.032)
L4.gdp growth wb -0.07** -0.14** -0.07**
(0.026) (0.052) (0.031)
L.cc LV 0.32 3.22 0.14
(1.083) (4.718) (1.264)
L2.cc LV 1.71 -2.06 2.25
(1.052) (1.638) (1.376)
L3.cc LV 0.25 -1.91*** 0.50
(0.878) (0.683) (1.165)
L4.cc LV 1.21* -0.61 1.47*
(0.618) (1.145) (0.768)
L.cc LV* L2FS -0.08 -1.55 -0.09
(0.166) (1.938) (0.177)
L2.cc LV* L3FS -0.27* 1.15 -0.35*
(0.162) (0.718) (0.193)
L3.cc LV * L4FS -0.08 1.01*** -0.14
(0.217) (0.301) (0.247)
L4.cc LV * L5FS -0.10 0.66 -0.15
(0.145) (0.647) (0.153)
Constant 3.07*** 1.78*** 3.94***
(0.226) (0.283) (0.316)
Observations 2,140 834 1,306
R-squared 0.05 0.17 0.04
Number of id 136 31 105
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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